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ABSTRACT
The degree to which statutory goals are pliable is likely to affect
significantly the ability of an agency with regulatory or management
responsibilities to achieve those objectives in the face of novel challenges
or changing circumstances. This Article explores this dynamic by
comparing the degree of “give” provided by the goals of the regimes
governing management of the five types of federal public lands in
responding to the challenges posed by climate change. It asserts that the
extent of climate change adaptation in which an agency engages is
influenced by a program’s legal adaptive capacity—the mutability of the
goals pursued under its authorizing legal framework.
Though a few scholars have explored the concept of adaptive
capacity as it applies to law, most focus on the impact of procedural
discretion on the ability to manage change. A comparative analysis of
federal land adaptation to climate change demonstrates that a management
regime’s legal adaptive capacity is influenced not only by procedural
flexibility, but also by the flexibility the agency has in defining and pursuing
a program’s substantive goals. Counterintuitively, for this reason, the land
regimes most closely tied to resource preservation goals have generally
lagged behind those with mixed conservation-commodity development
mandates in preparing for climate change. Accordingly, the Article
suggests ways to enhance the substantive legal adaptive capacity of land
management agencies to promote ecological health in the face of climate
change, and evaluates tradeoffs implicated when policymakers choose more
appropriate levels of such adaptive capacity.
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INTRODUCTION
The degree to which statutory goals are pliable is likely to affect
significantly the ability of an agency with regulatory or management
responsibilities to achieve those objectives in the face of novel challenges
or changing circumstances. This Article explores this dynamic by
comparing the degree of “give” provided by the management goals
governing the five types of federal public lands in response to the challenges
posed by climate change. It asserts that the comparative rapidity and extent
of climate change adaptation in which a natural resources management
agency engages is influenced by the adaptability of the goals identified in
its authorizing legal framework. This Article identifies this intrinsic
mutability as a program’s legal adaptive capacity.
Though some scholars have explored the concept of adaptive
capacity as it applies to law, almost all focus on the extent of agency
procedural discretion and its influence on an agency’s ability to manage
change.1 As demonstrated by a comparative analysis of federal land agency
1

See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1997) (proposing normative model for more adaptive regulatory
process); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive
Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 9798 (2010) (proposing adaptive process for managing complex regulatory problems);
Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present
to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 1156-57 (2009) (advocating integration
in climate change legislation of institutional design features that impede future alterations);
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adaptation to climate change, a regulatory or management regime’s legal
adaptive capacity is influenced not only by the extent of procedural
flexibility the implementing agency enjoys under its organic statute and
other sources of law, but also by the degree to which the underlying
program’s substantive goals are capable of accommodating shifts in
management approaches in response to change. Accordingly, the Article
recommends changes in the substantive legal adaptive capacity of federal
land management agencies that are likely to enhance their ability to better
address the considerable effects of climate change.
Various agencies manage the approximately twenty-eight percent,
or 635-640 million acres, of the land in the United States that is federally
owned.2 The four largest landholders are natural resource management
agencies. These include the United States Forest Service (USFS) in the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA), which manages nearly 193 million
acres,3 and three agencies in the Department of Interior (DOI): the National
Park Service (NPS), which manages approximately 80 million acres; the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which manages nearly 248 million
acres of land; and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), which manages
approximately 89 million acres of land as well as 217 million acres of
marine refuges and monuments.4 Additionally, more than 109 million
acres5 of federal conservation lands have been designated by Congress as
federal wilderness, subject to an additional regulatory overlay under the
Wilderness Act of 1964.6
Anthropogenic climate change will result in significant physical and
biological effects on all of these federal land systems. These changes, in
turn, will raise challenges to the capacity of the agencies under existing
federal land management laws to manage uncertainty and promote effective
Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive
Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 331, 349-51 (2007) [hereinafter Camacho I];
Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty
Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 36-40 (2009) [hereinafter Camacho
II]; Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive
Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2014); Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro,
Improving Regulation through Incremental Adjustment, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179 (2004);
Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1455
(2011); Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54
DUKE L.J. 913 (2005).
2
Ross W. Gorte et al., Federal Land Ownership: Overview and Data, CRS Report for
Congress 1 (2012), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf.
3
Id. at 1, 13.
4
Id. at 1, 13.
5
See The Beginnings of the National Wilderness Preservation System,
http://www.wilderness.net/index.cfm?fuse=NWPS&sec=fastfacts (last visited Sept. 22,
2014).
6
16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2006).
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conservation.7 Scholars and policymakers thus increasingly urge changes
to existing natural resources laws and institutions to better manage these
new fundamental challenges, largely highlighting the need for mechanisms
that promote procedural adaptive capacity by increasing access to
information and flexible implementation. Few, however, have considered
how a legal regime’s substantive goals may affect the adaptive capacity of
that regime to respond to climate change.
To varying degrees, the federal government has slowly turned its
attention to climate change adaptation planning and implementation,
spurred by directives issued by President Obama between 2009 and 2014.8
One might anticipate the pace and degree of climate change adaptation
activity to largely track the historical orientation of each land management
agency to ecological conservation, given the risk that climate change will
disrupt the ecological functioning of the natural resources these agencies
manage. In particular, some might expect that, in light of their focus on
resource preservation, the FWS and the NPS would be more attentive to the
potential effects of climate change and more apt to embrace the task of
preparing to adapt to these changes than the USFS and the BLM, which for
at least part of their histories emphasized extractive and consumptive uses.9
We posit, however, that because the management goals of the
statutory mandates under which the BLM and the USFS operate are pliant
enough to accommodate changed conditions, these agencies actually have
a greater legal adaptive capacity to engage in productive ecosystem
protection in preparation for climate change than the FWS and the NPS.
The two agencies’ multiple-use, sustained-yield mandates provide them
with broad authority to pursue management actions that maintain ecological
function, notwithstanding physical changes that pose novel management

7

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.A; U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION IN UNITED STATES FEDERAL NATURAL RESOURCE SCIENCE AND
MANAGEMENT AGENCIES: A SYNTHESIS vi (Jessica E. Halofsky et al. eds, April 2015),
http://www.globalchange.gov/sites/globalchange/files/ASIWG_Synthesis_4.28.15_final.
pdf [hereinafter USGCRP, SYNTHESIS] (“Although adequate scientific databases,
analytical tools, and decision support aids are generally available to assist with adaptation,
on-the-ground projects and plans relevant to resource management have been implemented
unevenly across agencies.”).
9
See Robert B. Keiter, Ecosystems and the Law: Toward an Integrated Approach, 8
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 332, 335 (1998) (stating that “federal land management
agencies traditionally have relied upon the multiple-use concept to give priority to
commodity production”). Cf. Robert L. Fischman, et al., Planning for Adaptation to
Climate Change: Lessons from the US National Wildlife Refuge System, 64 BIOSCIENCE
993, 993 (2014) (“If any system of nature reserves in the United States could demonstrate
best practices for climate-change adaptation, it would be the National Wildlife Refuge
System (NWRS), managed by the [FWS].”).
8
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challenges.10 The malleability of the goals set forth in the two agencies’
organic statutes positions them well to swiftly engage in meaningful climate
change adaptation activities. In contrast, the FWS and the NPS are charged
primarily with what we label “historical preservation”—maintaining
current ecological conditions or restoring managed lands to former
ecological conditions. Thus, although the two agencies possess significant
procedural flexibility to advance their statutory objectives,11 the substantive
goals they are directed to pursue may directly conflict with promoting
ecological health and are increasingly difficult if not impossible to attain for
some federal land units as climate changes.12 In addition, Congress
established federally designated wilderness areas primarily to minimize
active human management or disturbance—“wildness preservation”—and
secondarily to promote historical preservation.13 As a result, all four land
management agencies have limited capacity to actively manage wilderness
areas in the face of the threats posed by climate change.
A review of existing climate change adaptation activities by the
four federal land management agencies reflects the legal adaptive capacity
that their respective organic statutes suggest. Agencies that manage federal
lands subject to statutory goals that place more emphasis on promoting
historical fidelity (such as national parks) or on minimizing active
management (wilderness areas) have developed more modest adaptation
measures. Federal lands governed by statutory goals that place less
emphasis on historical or wildness preservation, principally those under the
charge of the USFS, have engaged in more robust adaptation planning and
measures, even if those measures did not take full advantage of the USFS’s
legal adaptive capacity. However, the BLM’s analogous and relatively
10

See infra Part III.B-C.
See, e.g., Western Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 766 F. Supp. 2d 1095 (D. Mont. 2011),
aff’d in part, 494 Fed. Appx. 740 (9th Cir. 2012); Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 698 F.
Supp. 2d 141, 149 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d, 651 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
12
See Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural Resource
Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1407 (2011) (arguing that “key preservationist goals
of natural resources law premised on historical preservation (the protection of resources or
landscapes in their historical condition) or passive management (minimizing human
involvement with nonhuman systems) will be increasingly costly, difficult, and even
impossible to meet” as a result of climate change); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming
the Past: The Theory and Practice of Historic Baselines in the Administrative State, 64
VAND. L. REV. 1, 53 (2011) (“Building adaptation strategies around historic baselines to
resist climate change thus is a losing proposition”); id. at 56 (characterizing historic
baselines as “maladapted” to climate change adaptation). Cf. Robin Kundis Craig,
“Stationarity Is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change
Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 17 (2010) (arguing that existing
preservationist natural resources laws “no longer reflect[] ecological realities”); id. at 3435 (claiming that “preservation paradigm” “threatens to dislocate the goals of natural
resources law from the ecological realities of a climate change era”).
13
See Camacho, supra note 12, at 1407.
11
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substantial legal adaptive capacity has not yet translated into significant
adaptation planning or concrete adaptation activities.14
Though the absence of clear and enforceable directives requiring the
BLM to exercise legal adaptive capacity could have been a factor, it is
evident that legal adaptive capacity alone does not determine the extent of
adaptation actually pursued or achieved.15 Factors like budgetary
resources,16 agency leadership, entrenched culture and tradition, and
resources can strongly influence a regime’s record on adaptivity, and we do
not discount the role that such factors may have played in the degree to
which the federal land management agencies have responded to the
challenges posed by climate change.17 Nonetheless, attending to a regime’s
substantive goals can help increase the likelihood that the program
effectively manages unanticipated challenges or changing circumstances
and remove obstacles to doing so.18 Indeed, if a statutory goal or
management standard forbids the administering agency from altering its
management approach in the face of change, then even an agency with
leaders who prioritize responsiveness to climatic changes and a culture in
which employees throughout the agency commit to pursuing leadership
goals is not likely to engage in effective climate change adaptation.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I discusses the concept of
legal adaptive capacity in regulatory or management institutions. It
distinguishes between the substantive and procedural dimensions of legal
14

See Kelli M. Archie et al., Climate Change and Western Public Lands: A Survey of U.S.
Federal Land Managers on the Status of Adaptation Efforts, 17(4) ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 20
(2012), http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol17/iss4/art20/ (concluding based on surveys
completed in 2011 by federal land managers in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming that the
BLM “has taken a less targeted approach to adaptation planning” than the other three land
management agencies). Cf. Victor B. Flatt, Adapting Laws for a Changing World: A
Systemic Approach to Climate Change Adaptation, 64 FLA. L. REV. 269, 291 (2012) (“In
theory, [the multiple use] legal mandate should be the ‘best’ option for climate change
adaptation because it provides a ‘resilient’ law that can alter resource usage without
statutory change. In practice, however, it has proven to be just the opposite, as agencies
routinely cling to a static balance of uses.”).
15
Agency management structure, which is an aspect of procedural legal adaptive capacity,
may play a role in the BLM’s slow response to the challenges posed by climate change.
See infra notes 468-472 and accompanying text.
16
A survey of employees of the four land management agencies in three western states
during 2011 identified budget constraints as one of the most significant barriers to both
adaptation planning and implementation. See Archie et al., supra note 14. Another
important factor was lack of information at relevant scales. Id. Additional factors included
personnel constraints, lack of perceived importance to the public, and lack of public
demand for action. Id.
17
See infra Part IV; USGCRP, SYNTHESIS, supra note 8, at vii (“Accomplishments in
preparing for climate change differ across the many agencies responsible for managing
land and water resources and for providing the science needed for resource management.
This is to be expected, given the diversity of agency missions, organizational culture,
programmatic structure, and scientific capability.”).
18
See infra Conclusion.
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adaptive capacity, and assesses potential tradeoffs of integrating more legal
adaptive capacity into a regulatory or management regime. Part II briefly
relates the concept of legal adaptive capacity to anthropogenic climate
change, explaining how this phenomenon is exerting enormous pressure not
only on the federal lands but also the processes and goals of the regimes that
manage them.
Part III assesses and compares the existing legal adaptive capacity
and climate-related adaptation activities of five federal land systems. After
briefly summarizing White House and department-wide directives by the
Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture, it considers lands administered
by the USFS and the BLM that are governed by flexible multiple-use,
sustained-yield mandates. It then discusses the legal adaptive capacity and
adaptation activities provided for national wildlife refuges, national parks,
and designated wilderness, which are subject to mandates that, to varying
degrees, focus on historical or wildness preservation. Part III illustrates that
though the various federal agencies have similar procedural legal adaptive
capacities, the relatively narrower substantive legal adaptive capacity
afforded agencies in managing the national parks, national wildlife refuges,
and wilderness areas is likely hindering the ability to effectively adapt those
lands to climate change in ways consistent with applicable statutory goals
and with promoting ecological health.
Based on the emerging federal experience with climate adaptation
planning and implementation measures, Part IV offers observations about
the role of legal adaptive capacity in promoting timely and effective
adaptation. We focus primarily on the significance of substantive legal
adaptive capacity because the literature on the tradeoffs implicated by
procedural adaptive capacity in environmental law is much more extensive.
Part V urges changes in the substantive standards that govern federal land
management to enhance legal adaptive capacity by placing greater emphasis
on promoting ecological function on lands governed by the multiple-use
mandate, and by detaching management goals from strict adherence to
historical or wildness preservation where climate change is likely to render
those goals ineffective at promoting ecological health.
I. A THEORY OF LEGAL ADAPTIVE CAPACITY
The concept of legal adaptive capacity draws from the growing
scholarly literature seeking to characterize and understand the dynamics of
ecological systems.19 The ecological literature introduced the concepts of
both resilience and adaptive capacity as phenomena in the natural world. A
natural system’s resilience measures its ability “to absorb impacts and
19

See generally SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE AND LAW 235 (Columbia Univ. Press
Ahjond S. Garmestani & Craig T. Allen, eds., 2014).
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continue to function, while adaptive capacity refers to a system’s ability to
change to adjust to new conditions.”20 Because of the convulsive changes
associated with it, climate change will test the resilience and adaptive
capacity of natural systems.21
Scholars have also applied the concept of adaptive capacity to
human social systems, including in the context of climate change
adaptation. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, for example,
defines adaptive capacity as “the ability or potential of a system to respond
successfully to climate variability and change, and includes adjustments in
both behaviour and in resources and technologies.”22 Researchers have
identified adaptive capacity as a “necessary condition for the design and
implementation of effective adaptation strategies so as to reduce the
likelihood and the magnitude of harmful outcomes resulting from climate
change.”23 In this context, scholars have studied the role of factors such as
education, income, health, knowledge, technology, and institutions on the
capability of communities to adapt to risks related to climate change.24
Limited attention, however, has been given to the influence of the adaptive
capacity of legal regimes in shaping climate change adaptation.
Like natural systems, legal systems may be more or less adaptive to
change. When Congress creates an administrative agency, it typically
identifies goals in the organic statute from which the agency derives its
authority and prescribes standards to which the agency must conform in its
pursuit of those goals.25 As scholars of regulation in different contexts have
recognized, “[a]ll regulators must adapt to change in order to remain
effective.”26 The same holds true for agencies acting as resource managers.
As Karl Llewellyn recognized in describing the common law system of
adjudication, “an adequately resilient legal system can . . . absorb the

20

Craig, supra note 12, at 23.
See Emma L. Tompkins & W. Neil Adger, Does Adaptive Management of Natural
Resources Enhance Resilience to Climate Change?, 9(2) ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 1, 1 (2004),
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art10/print.pdf (arguing “that a system’s
capacity for resilience . . . is an important element of any sustainable response to climate
change”).
22
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: WORKING
GROUP II: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 727 (2007).
23
Id.
24
Id. at 727-28.
25
In the absence of standards that supply an “intelligible principle” to guide agency
discretion, the statute may violate separation of powers principles. See Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2011).
26
Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629,
1635 (2011). Among other things, “regulators’ failure to evolve can [stem from] the
continuation of rules or policies that have become ineffective or counterproductive in light
of market change, or that were simply mistakes in the first place.” Id. at 1636.
21
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particular trouble and resolve it each time into a new, usefully guiding,
forward-looking felt standard-for-action or even rule-of-law.”27
Law can facilitate (or hamper) adaptation through both substantive
and procedural means. We refer to this adaptability as legal adaptive
capacity. In our conception, legal adaptive capacity denotes the formal
regulatory or management regime’s capacity to adapt to changes in the
phenomena it regulates. For our purposes, this regime includes rules
promulgated by public legal institutions, including legislatures, courts, or
administrative agencies (including agency regulations, manuals, plans, and
guidance). As we use the term, legal adaptive capacity does not refer to
other factors, such as resource constraints or agency culture, which may
nonetheless influence the adaptive capacity of a regulatory regime.28
The scope of a regime’s legal adaptive capacity turns on two axes.29
First, a legal regime, including one administered by an administrative
agency, may have goals that are more or less capable of accommodating
changed conditions. The degree to which statutory goals are capable of
accommodating change measures the regime’s substantive legal adaptive
capacity. Second, an agency may have more or less flexibility in
determining the processes or organizational structure it will use in pursuing
organic statute goals. We refer to that kind of flexibility as procedural legal
adaptive capacity. Thus, J.B. Ruhl has noted that it is “important to
distinguish between the resilience of the legal system’s underlying structure
and processes and the stability of the substantive content of the law.”30
Nonetheless, the significance of legal adaptive capacity—and in particular
27

KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 513 (1960).
See generally CHRISTINE PARKER & VIBEKE LEHMANN NIELSEN, EXPLAINING
COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION (2011) (discussing formal and
informal legal influences on regulatory compliance). Modern sociological literature draws
“a central distinction” between social structure and culture. Alejandro Portes, Institutions
and Development: A Conceptual Reanalysis, 32 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 233, 236
(2006); Gérard Roland, Understanding Institutional Change: Fast-Moving And SlowMoving Institutions, 38 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE INTL. DEV. 109 (2004) (distinguishing
between “slow-moving” institutions such as culture and “fast-moving” institutions such as
legal rules). In discussing adaptive capacity, other scholars have used the term more
broadly to encompass some of these other factors. See, e.g., Mostafa Mahmud Naser,
Climate Change, Environmental Degradation, and Migration: A Complex Nexus, 36 WM.
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 713, 756-57 (2012); Marissa Knodel, Conceptualizing
Climate Justice in Kivalina, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1179, 1206 (2014).
29
See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in
Legal Systems – With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373,
1379 (2011) (“The legal system, like any system, can be defined by its structure (e.g.,
constitutional division of powers) and processes (e.g., administrative decision
procedures).”).
30
Id. at 1383. Because this article focuses primarily on substantive legal adaptive capacity,
we do not dwell on the relationship between structural and procedural adaptive capacity.
Differences in agency organizational structure nevertheless may affect a program’s
adaptive capacity. See infra notes 468-475 and accompanying text (discussing how the
BLM’s organizational structure may impair its capacity to respond to climate change).
28
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substantive legal adaptive capacity—has been under-explored by the legal
and broader scholarly literature. In particular, it is important to consider the
tradeoffs of more or less procedural and substantive adaptive capacity in
designing a legal regime.
Drawing on the ecological concept of adaptability or resilience, this
Part elaborates on these different components of legal adaptive capacity and
provides examples of how the scope of an agency’s legal adaptive capacity
can affect its ability to successfully pursue statutory missions. In particular,
we focus on how the scope of each kind of legal adaptive capacity can
influence agency efforts to respond to novel challenges or changing
circumstances such as changing ecological dynamics. We also consider
potential generic tradeoffs of integrating more or less adaptive capacity into
a regulatory regime.
A. Substantive Legal Adaptive Capacity
Substantive legal adaptive capacity refers to the extent to which a
legal regime’s goals are capable of responding to changed conditions. An
agency with a high degree of substantive legal adaptive capacity has the
authority under its organic legislation to adjust its interpretation of
regulatory goals or the means of pursuing them to meet new challenges or
accommodate changed circumstances.31 At the other end of the spectrum, a
program with limited adaptive capacity has relatively rigid goals that do not
allow agencies to alter regulatory or management approaches
notwithstanding changed conditions. Of course, substantive legal adaptive
capacity is only meant to identify the extent of elasticity in regulatory goals;
as such, two regulatory regimes may have similar levels of substantive legal
adaptive capacity but regulatory goals that are significantly different.
An example of extensive substantive legal capacity is provided by
the Clean Air Act (CAA), which sets as its fundamental goal protection and
enhancement of air quality to promote the public health and welfare. 32 In
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to a denial
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of a petition to regulate
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from new motor vehicles.33 The agency
argued that GHGs did not qualify as “air pollutants” over which it had
regulatory jurisdiction.34 It claimed, among other things, that climate
change was such an important problem that unless the CAA “spoke with
31

See J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law As A Complex Adaptive System: How to
Clean Up the Environment by Making A Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV.
933, 938 (1997) (“Law . . . has the capacity to operate as a complex adaptive system.”).
32
42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2006).
33
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
34
The CAA requires EPA to limit emissions of “any air pollutant” from motor vehicles
which may contribute to health or welfare endangerment. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006).
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exacting specificity,” Congress could not have intended that EPA regulate
GHGs that contribute to it. 35 The Court rejected EPA’s limited conception
of its regulatory power. It characterized the statutory definition of an “air
pollutant”36 as “sweeping” and “capacious.”37 It made no difference that
Congress may not have been cognizant when it adopted the statute in 1970
of the risks posed by GHG emissions:
While the Congresses that drafted § 202(a)(1) might not have
appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to
global warming, they did understand that without regulatory
flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific developments
would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete. The broad
language of § 202(a)(1) reflects an intentional effort to confer the
flexibility necessary to forestall such obsolescence.38

Other courts have similarly construed the CAA as affording EPA broad
flexibility to protect public health and welfare from air pollution in the face
of uncertainty concerning evidence that is “on the frontiers of scientific
knowledge.”39
The two different domestic regulatory regimes that govern the
allocation of water provide a nice contrast between regulatory standards that
provide more and less substantive legal adaptive capacity. As Tony Arnold
has recognized, a critical question is “whether American water law regimes
35

EPA also contended that Congress designed the CAA to address local air pollutants, not
substances with consistent atmospheric concentrations, and that Congress declined to
require EPA to regulate GHG emissions. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 512.
36
The Act defines an “air pollutant” to include any “substance or matter which is emitted
or otherwise enters the ambient air.” 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2006).
37
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528, 532.
38
Id. at 532. More generally, the environment’s responses to human activities “have a
tremendous capacity . . . to take us by surprise despite our intensive efforts to study and
predict them.” Ruhl, supra note 31, at 954.
39
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Although the pliability of the
CAA’s goals and the breadth of its definition of an air pollutant allowed EPA to regulate
GHGs, an air pollutant that was not the focus of congressional concern in 1970,
nevertheless not all of the statute’s substantive regulatory programs are well-suited to
tackling climate change. The national ambient air quality standards, for example, would
not easily accommodate regulation of GHGs because they assume different localized
pollutant concentrations, whereas GHG concentrations are uniform worldwide. See Holly
Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the Clean Air Act's
Cooperative Federalism Framework Is Useful for Addressing Global Warming, 50 ARIZ.
L. REV. 799, 821 (2008) (“The one conspicuous misfit between the present Clean Air Act
and the global warming problem is the Act's reliance on national air quality standards.”);
cf. Jacob Kavkewitz, Comment, Jamming the Square Peg through the Round Hole: EPA’s
Options for Implementing Efficient Climate Change Regulation Under the Clean Air Act,
4 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1001, 1002 (2013) (“Even though the CAA is not an ideal
structure for addressing climate change, it is the most feasible option currently available
domestically for making serious progress in reducing GHG emissions.”).
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can become increasingly adaptive to changing conditions and sudden
disturbances.”40 Arnold’s answer is two-fold. He characterizes U.S. water
law as “full of inflexible rules that inhibit adaptive responses to disturbances
and changes,”41 pointing specifically to the prior appropriation system of
water rights that governs water allocation in most western states. In its
traditional form, that system is composed of “a hard-edged, or ‘crystalline,’
set of rules” that, by creating vested property rights in permit holders, “locks
in and protects historical uses, many of which were established over a
hundred years ago in the western United States, without regard to whether
those uses embody current views on the ‘highest and best use’ of limited
water.”42 Among the advantages of the prior appropriation system are
“predictability and certainty to support economic investment in
consumptive uses of water.”43 Such advantages come at a substantial cost,
however:
The rigidity of the priority system discourages or prevents
adaptive sharing of water during shortages. The combination of
measuring rights in specific quantities of appropriated water and
the use-it-or-lose-it rule deter improved efficiencies and adaptive
water conservation efforts. The persistence of defining beneficial
uses by historic rules and uses prevents regulators or courts from
determining that some water uses are no longer well-adapted to
the conditions in which they occur.44

Arnold contrasts this rigidity with “the looser ‘muddy’ riparian doctrine
followed in more water-rich areas.”45 Under that system for allocating
access to water, “[a] riparian owner’s rights are limited by the requirement
that his or her water use must be reasonable. What is reasonable depends
in part upon each riparian owner’s water use vis-à-vis other riparian owners,
40

Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Adaptive Water Law, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1043, 1043
(2014).
41
Id. at 1057.
42
Id. Under a prior appropriation system, appropriators who secured their allocative rights
before others did so are entitled to their full allocations before junior appropriators are
entitled to any of theirs. See, e.g., Aransas Project v. Shaw, 930 F. Supp. 2d 716, 738 n.28
(S.D. Tex. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 756 F.3d 801 (5th Cir. 2014), opinion amended
and superseded, 774 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2014). Prior appropriation doctrine may have lost
some of its hard edges over time, however. See Charles F. Wilkinson, In Memoriam: Prior
Appropriation, 1848-1991, 21 ENVTL. L. xvi (1991). The incorporation of market
mechanisms into prior appropriation systems, for example, may allow reallocation of water
rights to those who now value them most highly. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior
Appropriation in the New West, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 769, 772 (2001); see generally
James L. Huffman, Water Marketing in Western Prior Appropriation States: A Model for
the East, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 429, 448 (2004).
43
Arnold, supra note 40, at 1058.
44
Id. at 1058.
45
Id. at 1057; see generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Evolution of Riparianism in the
United States, 95 MARQUETTE L. REV. 53, 87 (2011).
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the public’s rights, and the circumstances of each case. The test is a flexible
one capable of changing over time . . . .”46
To the extent that substantive adaptive capacity includes not only
the flexibility of a regime’s fundamental goal but also the controls and
strategies employed to achieve that goal, the familiar distinction between
rules and standards is also relevant to an assessment of the scope of a legal
regime’s substantive adaptive capacity.47 Rules tend to be “clearly defined
[and] highly administrable,” thus providing more certainty and regulatory
efficiency, while standards “produc[e] ad hoc decisions with relatively little
precedential value,”48 and thus are more concerned with the effectiveness
of decision-making than efficiency.49 Professor Arnold draws on this
distinction in describing an adaptive legal system as one that adapts to
changing conditions by using “context-regarding standards and flexible
discretionary decision making, in contrast to legal abstractions, rigid rules,
and excessive limits on action and authority.”50 Others regard “the levels
of clarity and flexibility” provided as “crucial to the distinction between
rules and standards.”51 As Kathleen Sullivan has recognized, “[r]ules tend
toward obsolescence. Standards, by contrast, are flexible and permit
decision-makers to adapt them to changing circumstances over time.”52 The
distinction between rules and standards blurs at the edges, however, as “the
categorical distinctions being attempted are not binary but more akin to a
pluralism, continuum or synthesis.”53
Sherry A. Enzler et al., Finding a Path to Sustainable Water Management: Where We’ve
Been, Where We Need to Go, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 842, 858 (2013).
47
Frederick Schauer calls the distinction “tediously familiar.” Frederick Schauer, The
Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803,
804 (2005).
48
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1685 (1976). As Professor Schauer has put it, rule adopters make most of the
substantive choices at the time of the drafting, while standards allow choices “to be made
at the moment of application.” Schauer, supra note 47, at 803.
49
See Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 36 (2000) (“[B]ecause rules are specified ex ante, even
complex rules will sometimes fail to take account of all factual variations that might arise
ex post which might be relevant to optimal tailoring of legal boundaries.”).
50
Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Resilient Cities and Adaptive Law, 50 IDAHO L. REV.
245, 253 (2014).
51
Michael Faure et. al., The Regulator’s Dilemma: Caught Between the Need for Flexibility
& the Demands of Foreseeability, Reassessing the Lex Certa Principle, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI.
& TECH. 283, 292 (2014).
52
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 66
(1992); see also Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 400 (1985)
(claiming that “standards are seen as more appropriate when flexibility, individualization,
open-endedness, and dynamism are important”).
53
Alejandro E. Camacho, Going the Way of the Dodo: De-Extinction, Dualisms, and
Reframing Conservation, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 44)
(available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2478815).
46
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B. Procedural Legal Adaptive Capacity
Procedural legal adaptive capacity measures the degree to which a
legal regime’s process is able to adjust to new policy directions or
information or changed factual circumstances. According to Professor
Arnold, “[a]n adaptive law system recognizes and embraces iterative
processes among multiple participants, instead of linear decision-making
and implementation processes by a single authority.”54 At one end of the
spectrum of procedural adaptability is the U.S. Constitution, which, among
other things, creates a rigorous process for amendment. The Constitution
“displays little tolerance for structural or process change. It was designed
to be hard to alter in design.”55
Other forms of lawmaking tend to be more procedurally adaptable,
but not uniformly so. The Anglo-American common law system, for
example, is in some ways more procedurally adaptive than the legislative
process. A common law court has the capacity to distinguish previous cases
when it addresses fact situations that differ from those previously
presented.56 If Congress wants to amend a statute to address a new situation
not covered by existing law, or because changed circumstances have
undercut the effectiveness of existing law, it must follow the
constitutionally prescribed method for changing the law – adoption of the
same bill by both houses of Congress and either presidential signature or
legislative override of a presidential veto by a two-thirds vote.57
Within the realm of administrative law, statutes make it easier for
agencies to shift course in some contexts than in others. The Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), for example, imposes more rigorous procedural
requirements for the adoption of formal than informal rules.58 Thus, an
agency subject to formal rulemaking procedure is likely to have to devote
54

Arnold, supra note 50, at 253.
Ruhl, supra note 29, at 1380. Cf. Lazarus, supra note 1, at 1180 (describing “strong
structural bias within our existing lawmaking institutions in favor of government acting
slowly and incrementally.”); id. at 1198 (arguing that the Constitution makes lawmaking
difficult “to guard against potential overreaction to more immediate impulses of the
moment”).
56
See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 29, at 1381 (describing the American common law system as
“an example of ecological resilience” with “a high capacity for swings in behavior in
response to changing conditions without altering the system’s basic structure and process
design”). Justice Holmes’ “claim that legal doctrines evolve in response to changes in the
social environment has become virtually a canon of professional faith for American
lawyers.” E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 38, 51 (1985). Cf. Hornstein, supra note 1, at 921 (describing view that when
common law doctrines were inefficient and judges made mistakes, people adversely
affected by those rules “would have a greater incentive to litigate and relitigate them”).
57
U.S. CONST. art. I, §7, cl. 2.
58
Compare 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (2006) with id. § 553(b)-(c).
55
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more time and resources to rule promulgation than if it need only comply
with notice-and-comment procedures.59 If an agency chooses to adopt a
nonbinding non-legislative rule, most APA rulemaking requirements do not
apply at all.60
Another aspect of regulation that leads to differential procedural
legal adaptive capacity is the extent to which it relies on what one of us has
referred to as “front-end decision-making” processes or “back-end
adjustments.”61 Front-end requirements are designed to rationalize
regulation on the basis of rational choice theory, microeconomic efficiency
models, and cost-benefit analysis.62 “Back-end” mechanisms allow
policymakers to make incremental adjustments in regulatory approaches or
applications based on factors such as the actual impacts of regulation,
changed circumstances, or information that was unavailable at the time of
initial regulatory adoption.63 Reliance on back-end adjustments, such as
variances, exceptions, or deadline extensions, mitigates the problems
resulting from the bounded rationality facing agencies when they seek to
design a one-shot solution at the inception of the regulatory process.64 The
authority to make back-end adjustments creates regulatory flexibility that
can mitigate unfair or unintended results, thereby increasing the legitimacy
of regulatory efforts.65 That enhanced flexibility may come at a price,
however, as reliance on back-end adjustments can water down regulatory
standards and allow regulators to cater to the desires of regulated entities or
beneficiaries in ways that may not be transparent.66
Professor Ruhl characterizes much of environmental law as fixated
on reliance on front-end approaches such as environmental assessment and
cost-benefit analysis, producing a system that “shows no signs of being

59

Cf. ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & RICHARD E. LEVY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY
ACTION IN LEGAL CONTEXT 378 (Foundation Press 2d ed. 2014) (arguing that more
extensive rulemaking procedures may “reduc[e] regulatory output” due to lengthier and
more costly process); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Transformation of the U.S. Rulemaking
Process—For Better or for Worse, 34 OHIO N. UNIV. L. REV. 469, 473-74 (2008) (finding
that hybrid procedures contributed to a decline in rulemaking output of agencies like EPA).
60
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2006).
61
Glicksman & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 1179.
62
Id. at 1183.
63
Id. at 1179.
64
See SIDNEY A SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 23 (Stanford 2003) (describing bounded rationality
as the result of “time, resource, and cognitive constraints that make it virtually impossible
to verify that the solution [reflected in a regulation at the time of its adoption] chosen is
optimal”).
65
Glicksman & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 1185-87 (describing the potential benefits of backend adjustments).
66
Glicksman & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 122-23.
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flexible.”67 He asserts that this lack of flexibility tends to thwart efforts to
adjust laws and “move toward ecological resilience strategies when
variability is on the rise and prediction is unreliable.”68 Numerous other
scholars have similarly criticized the procedural rigidity of environmental
laws69 and administrative regulation more generally.70 One of us has
previously characterized current natural resource management laws as
directing “virtually all agency attention and resources . . . at the initial
decision, regardless of how little information there is to make the decision.
Once an initial decision is made, whether regarding an individual project or
an entire program, the agency rarely revisits it in any systematic way to
adjust the decision or learn from its successes or limitations for future
actions.”71 As a result, “natural resource decision making reflects a static,
front-end approach to resource regulation and management.”72
Many scholars urge greater reliance on a back-end technique that
has received much attention in the environmental law literature, adaptive
management.73 Adaptive management allows incremental policy and
decision adjustments at the “back end,” under a framework in which altering
course if conditions warrant is an essential ingredient.74 An adaptive
management framework is “evolutionary . . . , relying on iterative cycles of
goal determination, model building, performance standard setting, outcome
monitoring, and standard recalibration.”75 It therefore provides greater
adaptive capacity than a regulatory approach that creates procedural
constraints on pursuing changes in initial regulatory strategies. However,
adaptive management may not be appropriate in all circumstances, 76 and
less rigorous alternatives to formal adaptive management, such as

67

Ruhl, supra note 29, at 1392.
Id. at 1393.
69
See, e.g., Camacho II, supra note 1, at 36-40.
70
See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 1, at 3, 35; Michael C. Dorf & Charles E. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
71
Camacho, supra note 12, at 1414.
72
Id.
73
See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adaptive Management Seriously: A Case Study of the
Endangered Species Act, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1249 (2004).
74
J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 21, 30 (2005); see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, Panarchy and Adaptive Change:
Around the Loop and Back Again, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 59, 75 (2005).
75
Ruhl, supra note 29, at 1391.
76
See, e.g., HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, MAKING GOOD
USE
OF
ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT
5-9
(2011),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1808106 (stating that adaptive
management should only be used if there are information gaps, good prospects for learning,
and opportunities for adjustment in the regulatory process).
68
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contingency planning,77 also seek to incentivize iterative planning and
periodic adjustments (and thus increase procedural adaptive capacity).78
Other forms of flexible decision-making processes that have
received attention in the environmental policy arena include new
governance and dynamic federalism. “New governance” theory favors
“collaborative, multi-party, multi-level, adaptive, problem-solving”
governance, whose central organizing principles are “stakeholder
participation, collaboration among interests, diversity of and competition
between instruments, decentralization of governance structure, integration
of policy domains, flexibility, and an emphasis on noncoerciveness and
adaptation.”79 Dynamic federalism, in which regulatory jurisdiction is
presumptively within the authority of both the federal and state
governments, “builds scalability, modularity, and response diversity into
the system.”80 Back-end adjustment regimes such as adaptive management
or new governance are examples of regulatory approaches with a relatively
high degree of procedural legal adaptive capacity.
The manner in which an agency’s structure is prescribed by statute,
regulation, or other sources of law of course is connected to its procedural
legal adaptive capacity.81 Scholars have discussed the relationship between
structure and process in other contexts.82 The nature of an agency’s vertical
hierarchy, for example, may determine the number of participating decision
makers and the need for internal appeal or review procedures. Similarly,
scholarship has noted that how well an agency integrates scientific
information into decision making or the extent of intra-agency
77

See, e.g., Gregg P. Macey, The Architecture of Ignorance, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1627,
1667 (2013) (discussing use of contingency planning to accommodate data gaps in
environmental law).
78
Camacho, supra note 12, at 1449.
79
Ruhl, supra note 29, at 1397. See Chelsea Rose Johansen, Solving “The Gravest Natural
Resource Shortage You’ve Never Heard of”: Applying Transnational New Governance to
the Phosphate Industry, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 933 (2013). For skepticism about the
value of “institutional experimentation . . . under the new governance banner,” see Donald
T. Hornstein, Resiliency, Adaptation, and the Upsides of Ex Post Lawmaking, 89 N.C. L.
REV. 1549, 1555-56 (2011); Douglas Nejaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST.
L.J. 323 (2009).
80
Ruhl, supra note 29, at 1398, 1401. See generally Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the
Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159 (2006); XuanThao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 449 (2010).
81
As noted above, Professor Ruhl distinguishes between a legal system’s structure and
processes. See Ruhl, supra note 29, at 1379.
82
See, e.g., Jonathan Rothchild, Law, Religion, and Culture: The Function of System in
Niklas Luhmann and Kathryn Tanner, 24 J.L. & RELIGION 475, 494 (2009) (referring to
“the relationship between structure and operation (process), or norm and action, or rule and
decision”). For further discussion of the manner in which agency structure can affect legal
adaptive capacity, see infra notes 468-472 and accompanying text (discussing the impact
of the BLM’s decentralized structure on its approach to climate change adaptation).
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centralization or coordination can influence the capacity of an agency to
adapt.83 Indeed, proponents of adaptive management have emphasized the
development of formal organizational structures that can promote adaptive
decision making.84
C. Legal Adaptive Capacity and Values Tradeoffs
The absence of either substantive or procedural legal adaptive
capacity may hinder an agency’s ability to accommodate changed
circumstances in pursuing statutory goals. The lack of adaptability is
troublesome if existing legal rules produce outcomes that were once desired
but are no longer acceptable.85 As Richard Lazarus has argued,
“[f]lexibility is necessary to allow for the modification of legal requirements
over time in light of new information.”86 Yet, legal adaptive capacity is not
uniformly desirable.87 Donald Hornstein has noted that “there is such a
thing as too much adaptivity” and substantive resilience and adaptability in
a legal system is not “an unalloyed good.”88 As the debate over the
desirability of rules and standards reveals, adaptive and non-adaptive legal
systems each have advantages and disadvantages. In choosing the desirable
form and extent of adaptability, those designing a legal system need to
assess and strike a balance between the benefits and costs of adaptability.
A regime with limited substantive legal adaptive capacity has
certain advantages over a more loosely defined and adaptable system.
Because decision-makers, such as agencies, have less flexibility, they may
apply legal rules more consistently than if their ability to craft contextual
legal solutions is more expansive. Consistency in decision-making may
promote stability and fairness and protect against arbitrariness.89 A nonadaptive system is also likely to generate more predictable results, creating

83

See, e.g., Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and the Hallmarks
of Modern Organic Legislation, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 457, 555 (2002) (discussing FWS’s
weak integration of data influencing its ability to respond to new circumstances); Lawrence
Susskind et al., A Critical Assessment of Collaborative Adaptive Management in Practice,
49 J. APPLIED ECOLOGY 47 (2011) (discussing cases of weak integration of scientific
information into decision making influencing capacity of a regulatory program to adapt).
84
See, e.g., Camacho II, supra note 1; Dorf & Sabel, supra note 70.
85
See Ruhl, supra note 29, at 1382.
86
Lazarus, supra note 1, at 1157.
87
Id. at 1205-07 (proposing limits on capacity for certain future alterations to legislation
addressing climate change).
88
Hornstein, supra note 79, at 1552. Hornstein refers to a resilient legal system that returns
to path-dependent roots or is based on “suspect or even despised intellectual foundations.”
Id.
89
See Sullivan, supra note 52, at 62. Rules may generate unfair results, however. See
Ruhl, supra note 29, at 1402 (noting tradeoffs between a legal system’s resilience and the
stability of its substantive content).
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a degree of certainty that an adaptive system likely cannot match. 90
Certainty, in turn, may create incentives for affected interests to commit to
actions and investments they may avoid if legal outcomes are
unpredictable.91 In addition, a non-adaptive system may be more efficient
to administer because decision-makers such as agencies choose from a
limited number of prescribed solutions rather than inventing new
approaches on a case-by-case basis.92
In contrast, a legal system characterized by significant substantive
legal adaptive capacity is likely better at allowing decision-makers such as
agencies to reach results that promote relevant policy goals in unanticipated
or changed circumstances. A regime that lacks such capacity is likely to
sacrifice the potential to tailor decisions to changing conditions in ways that
promote regulatory or management goals.93 A substantively adaptive
system thus can reduce the risk that the quest for consistency leads to the
application of fixed and bright-line rules to factual contexts for which they
were not designed or are otherwise ill-matched.94
Substantive legal adaptive capacity also may increase the risk that
agencies will abuse their discretionary authority. For example, flexible
goals provide an increased capacity to promote the interests of favored
constituencies instead of the broader public interest.95 Statutory constraints
on substantive flexibility can minimize such “slippage.”96 One important
question for policymakers, therefore, is whether they regard it as more
important to create a substantively nimble legal system or to reduce the risk
that agencies vested with broad flexibility to accommodate solutions to
novel challenges will stray from or subvert statutory goals.97
90

Cf. Eric Biber, Adaptive Management and the Future of Environmental Law, 46 AKRON
L. REV. 933, 948 (2013) (arguing that flexibility creates uncertainty, which “creates
significant costs—economic, social, psychological” for communities in which adaptive
management is occurring).
91
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1179 (1989) (arguing that rules promote desirable predictability).
92
Sullivan, supra note 52, at 63 (explaining how rules promote economies for legal
decision makers).
93
Camacho, supra note 53, at 44.
94
Sullivan, supra note 52, at 62 (noting that “bright-line rules are arbitrary at the border).
95
See Craig, supra note 12, at 64 (“Of course, increasing regulatory flexibility always
opens the door to potential abuse.”); see also Robert L. Glicksman, Ecosystem Resilience
to Disruptions Linked to Global Climate Change: An Adaptive Approach to Federal Land
Management, 87 NEB. L. REV. 833, 836-37, 862 (2009) (describing the problematic nature
of excessive grants of discretion). Some have argued, for example, that the flexible
multiple use mandate that governs USFS and BLM land management has resulted in such
a skewing of agency priorities. See, e.g., Jan G. Laitos &Thomas A. Carr, The
Transformation on Public Lands, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 140, 212 (1999).
96
Biber, supra note 90, at 949.
97
Cf. Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 5 (2014) (identifying “the central challenge of the modern administrative state: how to
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Choosing the desirable level of a legal system’s procedural legal
adaptive capacity turns on similar tradeoffs. A non-adaptive system that
relies on front-end decision making is likely to be less resource-intensive.
An iterative process such as adaptive management has both direct
implementation costs and opportunity costs,98 as do information-sharing
frameworks.99 In addition, some forms of process flexibility (such as the
authority to craft policy through non-legislative rules) can lead to reduced
public participation, which can impair the information base on which
agencies make decisions and reduce accountability.100 Further, flexibility
and back-end techniques may delay decision-making to a time when
resource constraints prevent or impair the quality of agency management
actions.101 Furthermore, agencies purporting to engage in adaptive
management or other forms of iterative decision-making may actually be
“kicking the can down the road” by deferring difficult decisions to an
undetermined future time.
Such an approach obviously reduces
accountability.102 Policymakers should consider whether they are
comfortable with the likelihood that experimentation with context-specific
solutions will sometimes fail. Such failures may result in lost or impaired
resources; however, reliance on an inflexible management regime to deal
with changed circumstances may produce similar or even greater harm.103
Finally, reducing uncertainty beyond a certain point may be impossible, and
problems may demand immediate attention that do not provide the luxury
of learning through iterative approaches such as adaptive management.104
On the other hand, heightened procedural legal adaptive capacity
may allow agencies to act more quickly than under a less adaptive system.
An agency that has the choice of pursuing statutory policies through either
balance the pragmatic need for administrative flexibility with respect for the rule of law
and democratic values”).
98
See id. at 945-46. For further discussion of the disadvantages of reliance on adaptive
management and similar forms of process flexibility and dynamism, see HOLLY DOREMUS
ET AL., CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, MAKING GOOD USE OF ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT
5-9
(2011),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1808106.
99
See Flatt, supra note 14, at 284 (noting that detrimental impact of underfunding on
information-sharing).
100
Biber, supra note 90, at 949. See also Gregory N. Mandel & Gary E. Marchant, The
Living Regulatory Challenges of Synthetic Biology, 100 IOWA L. REV. 155, 195 (2014).
101
Biber, supra note 90, at 950.
102
See DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 92, at 11 (“One of the most significant weaknesses of
adaptive management to date has been that agencies have promised future adaptation but
not delivered it.”); J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts,
95 MINN. L. REV. 440, 461 (2010) (discussing “temptation of adaptive management . . . to
lavish attention on the iterative process at the expense of addressing the substantive
management criteria required by law”).
103
Biber, supra note 90, at 947.
104
Id. at 940-42.
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legislative or non-legislative rules, for example, can respond more quickly
to the need for action by avoiding the procedural steps that accompany
adoption of a binding rule. Another important potential advantage of more
iterative forms of expansive procedural legal adaptive capacity is to afford
agencies and other decision-makers the flexibility to make decisions based
on less-than-perfect information, monitor the results, re-evaluate the initial
decision, and, if appropriate, adjust future management.105 Many scholars
and policymakers have extolled the benefits of adopting processes that
integrate continued monitoring and adjustment, including increased
effectiveness, legitimacy, and potentially even long-term implementation
costs.106 The benefits of increased procedural adaptive capacity may be
particularly strong in regulatory contexts where there is incomplete
understanding and the regulated system is changing.107
In short, those designing or refashioning a legal regime, including
one that governs natural resource management in the era of climate change,
should consider the tradeoffs involved in identifying the appropriate degree
of both substantive and procedural legal adaptive capacity. Of course, the
desirability of more or less adaptive legal regimes will depend on context,
and the assessment of such tradeoffs may itself vary if the regime’s
underlying circumstances fundamentally change. Adaptability, substantive
or procedural, may be the superior choice in situations characterized by
dynamism and complexity, but not where those features are lacking and
malleability gains do not offset the loss of values like predictability and
accountability.108
II. CLIMATE DISRUPTION AND LEGAL ADAPTIVE CAPACITY
Unfortunately, global climate change is shifting both the physical
and regulatory landscape for federal conservation lands to such an extent
that it makes reconsideration of the legal adaptive capacity of longstanding
management regimes appropriate. Over the next several decades, climate
change is widely anticipated to have significant effects on the various
105

See Craig & Ruhl, supra note 1, at 4.
See, e.g., BYRON K. WILLIAMS ET AL., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT WORKING GROUP,
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR TECHNICAL GUIDE 17
(2007); Freeman, supra note 1, at 28; Alejandro E. Camacho, Mustering the Missing
Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and
Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions, Installment Two, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269,
307-14 (2005) (detailing studies analyzing flexible, collaborative processes and finding
better quality decisions, more public acceptability, and decreased long-term cost); Dorf &
Sabel, supra note 70, at 285.
107
See DOREMUS ET AL., supra note 92, at 5.
108
See Biber, supra note 90, at 958-59. Biber adds, however, that “where dynamism and
complexity [are] so high that learning is impossible, we might again be better off with
relatively rigid, inflexible standards based on front-end analysis.”
106
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federal lands.109 Even if significant and widespread mitigation strategies
are adopted that substantially reduce carbon emissions worldwide, federal
lands will experience substantial and potentially detrimental effects for
decades.110 All four major land systems will be affected. Species may
become separated from key habitat in federal wildlife refuges. For example,
projected sea level rise may significantly alter habitat at coastal refuges for
protected plant and animal species.111 Sea-level rise is expected to affect
173 wildlife refuges.112 Climate change is also anticipated to significantly
alter the natural resources in national parks. According to the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS), for example, some of the largest glaciers in
Glacier National Park may melt by 2030.113 On the BLM public lands,
climate change may exacerbate existing stressors such as wildfires and
invasive species, impairing the BLM’s ability to manage those lands for
multiple uses.114 Persistent droughts, for example, may force the BLM to
limit livestock grazing to protect drought-stressed plant and animal
species.115 Wildfires, invasive species, and extreme weather events are
already affecting national forests, and will be exacerbated by climate
change.116 These physical and biological changes raise fundamental
challenges to the resilience of natural ecosystems117 and thus to the agencies
charged with managing the nation’s federal public lands.
More fundamentally, there is growing recognition that these
physical and biological effects are already putting substantial stress on
existing natural resource legal regimes, and these regimes increasingly will
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have trouble coping with these stressors.118 Climate change considerably
elevates the level of uncertainty for resource management due to the
increased complexity and various potentially confounding variables.119
This increased uncertainty, when combined with the limited adaptive
capacity of existing natural resource laws and management institutions,120
is a more serious concern than climate change’s potential physical
effects.121 Climate change raises serious impediments to the capacity of the
laws and institutions governing public land management to serve the
purposes for which they were established.122
Various scholars thus assert that existing law and institutions need
to adapt to manage effectively the challenges raised by climate change.123
More precisely, scholars and policymakers increasingly acknowledge that
climate change necessitates improved procedural adaptive capacity. Many
have encouraged the integration of procedural or structural adaptation
strategies to increase regulatory institutions’ ability to manage the
uncertainty of climate change, such as scenario planning,124 adaptive
management,125 or agency structures that promote learning through the
See Craig, supra note 12, at 30 (asserting that climate change adaptation “challenges . .
. the existing capacity of legal institutions”); Ruhl, supra note 29, at 1375-76.
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collection, dissemination, and use of information about climate effects and
management strategies.126
However, few scholars or policymakers have paid sufficient
attention to the significance of substantive legal adaptive capacity.
Professor Craig has described a mismatch between climate change
adaptation and the preservation and restoration goals in certain pollution
control and natural resource laws.127 Similarly, one of us has raised
questions about the long-term compatibility of natural resources laws that
primarily focus on promoting historical or wildness preservation with the
promotion of ecological health in the face of climate change.128 Eric Biber
and Elisabeth Long have addressed the capacity of agencies managing
wilderness to accommodate climate change.129 The remainder of this
Article systematically evaluates the relationship between federal land law
goals and the production of effective responses to climate change impacts
as an example of how substantive legal adaptive capacity can influence
responses to unanticipated regulatory challenges or changing
circumstances.
III. ASSESSING FEDERAL LAND LEGAL ADAPTIVE CAPACITY
CLIMATE ADAPTATION

AND

Although Congress has not adopted comprehensive climate change
adaptation legislation, federal agencies have engaged in adaptation planning
activities for over a decade, to varying degrees. The five major federal
natural resource management systems—national forests, public lands,
national wildlife refuges, national parks, and designated wilderness—have
been subject to a similar suite of initiatives at the White House or
Departmental level to engage in climate change adaptation activities. The
President, DOI, and USDA have repeatedly directed and provided guidance
to agencies to integrate climate change adaptation into their policies and
programs. Nonetheless, these five land systems have been subject to a wide
See Camacho II, supra note 1, at 1 (recommending development of “adaptive
governance” framework); PROGRESS REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY CLIMATE
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variation in the types and degree of climate change adaptation.130 This Part
explores the extent to which legal adaptive capacity correlates with the
extent of adaptation planning and implementation activities to date for each
of the five land regimes.
Historically, the approaches to land and resource management have
differed sharply among federal land systems. The BLM and the USFS,
often referred to as multiple use agencies,131 for significant parts of their
histories, tended to be driven—and some assert captured—by consumptive
uses.132 The USFS has been considered by many to be primarily focused
on timber harvesting.133 The BLM has long been closely linked to
facilitating grazing134 and mineral development.135 These two agencies’
organic statutes, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA)136
and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA),137 are largely
pragmatic, utilitarian, and instrumental.138
They literally endorse
sustainability – which, under at least some interpretations, amounts to
maintenance of ecological function or integrity139 – and delegate broad
discretion to do what is necessary to achieve it. The substantive
management mandates under these two statutes are also highly flexible.
The multiple-use, sustained-yield standards that govern the BLM and the
Cf. Archie et al., supra note 14 (finding that “[t]he only statistically robust predictor of
being farther along in the adaptation process was the agency identity itself”).
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USFS “breathe discretion at every pore.”140 Accordingly, we argue that the
BLM and the USFS have relatively expansive legal adaptive capacity and
are therefore relatively well positioned to engage in meaningful climate
change adaptation activities.141
Wilderness management aside, the USFS has in fact responded with
greater alacrity and precision to the White House or Departmental prompts
than agencies responsible for managing any of the other land systems. This
includes the BLM, even though presidential directives apply equally to the
two agencies and DOI began imposing adaptation mandates on its agencies
about a decade before USDA. Though differences in the extent that goal
modification was compulsory may account for these disparities, the BLM’s
slower responsiveness is likely due in part to other factors that hindered its
willingness or ability to take advantage of its adaptive authority.142
Other federal land systems are subject to different management
prescriptions. The FWS143 and the NPS,144 which are sometimes
characterized as dominant use agencies,145 are often regarded as more
committed to the conservation of the natural resources they manage than the
USFS or the BLM.146 One might therefore expect the FWS and the NPS to
be more attentive to the potential effects of climate change on their
jurisdictional lands and to be more apt to embrace the task of preparing to
adapt to these changes.147
Yet, the rules governing the NPS’ and the FWS’ management
authority afford them less substantive legal adaptive capacity than provided
for national forests and BLM lands. The organic statute and interpretive
policies that govern management of the national parks, and the FWS’s
implementing regulations and policies for the National Wildlife Refuge
Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 661 F.3d 1209, 1235 (10 th Cir. 2011); Perkins v.
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System (NWRS), seek to preserve those lands, typically by reference to an
historical baseline. Importantly, agency interpretations and management
“ha[ve] historically been based on the idea of maintaining current
environmental conditions or restoring species and habitats to some desired
former condition.”148 For NPS lands and wildlife refuges in Alaska or that
include official wilderness, the preferred if not required approach is
minimalist management to non-intervention. Official wilderness that is part
of the National Wilderness Preservation System is subject to management
mandates under the Wilderness Act of 1964 that are most closely rooted in
non-intervention.
Neither the historical nor wildness preservation goal fits well with
the management approaches needed to promote ecological health in a
changing climate. Climate change may obliterate historical conditions,
making management to retain them very costly if not impossible. It also
will increasingly require active management to retain or restore ecological
health. In short, the NWRS’s integration of historical preservation with
more flexible sustainability goals makes it subject to a moderate level of
substantive legal adaptive capacity; national parks, which are more heavily
tied to historical preservation, are governed under a regime with limited
substantive legal adaptive capacity; while the emphasis on non-intervention
in official wilderness provides the least adaptive capacity.
It is therefore not surprising to us that these regimes have not
incorporated climate change adaptation into their decision-making
frameworks yet to the same extent that the USFS has. In fact, the extent of
adaptation activities correlates with the substantive adaptive capacity of the
land regime, with refuges having made more progress on adaptation,
followed by national parks. In the context of wilderness management,
climate change adaptation has essentially gone missing.
A. Executive Branch and Department-Wide Initiatives
President Barack Obama has consistently prioritized climate
preparedness. He issued an executive order in 2009 establishing a task force
to create an initial adaptation strategy and directing all federal agencies to
develop vulnerability assessments and adaptation plans.149 Subsequently,
the President directed agencies to protect biodiversity and conserve natural
resources in the face of climate change.150 A second executive order issued
in 2013 replaced the initial task force with a multi-agency Council on
148
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Climate Preparedness and Resilience tasked with recommending actions to
encourage climate preparedness and resilience.151
In 2014, the Council issued a report152 identifying priority strategies
to make the nation’s natural resources more resilient to climate change,
including (1) fostering climate-resilient lands and waters and (2)
modernizing federal programs to build resilience.153 The report concluded
that despite progress in pursuing the first strategy,154 “management at the
landscape scale is not yet the norm.”155 It directed agencies to develop and
provide decision-support tools to improve their capacity to manage for
resilience and to select priority areas for conservation, restoration, or other
investments to build resilience.156 The report further directed specific
agencies, including DOI and USDA, to develop “resilience metrics.”157
With respect to the second priority, the Council directed agencies with
natural resources responsibilities to identify best practices for applying
resilience criteria to program management.158 For the most part, the
Council’s directives apply to all federal agencies with natural resourcesrelated responsibilities. The details of implementation in many cases,
however, are left to departments or individual agencies within departments.
DOI has long engaged in department-wide climate change
adaptation initiatives. In 2001, the Interior Secretary issued an order
directing DOI agencies to consider climate change impacts in planning,
priority-setting, and resource management.159 In 2009, Interior Secretary
Kenneth Salazar replaced that order with Secretarial Order 3289,160 which
established a Climate Change Response Council to execute a coordinated
Department-wide strategy.161 The Secretary directed the Council to work
with the USGS to rename previously created “regional hubs” as Regional
151
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Climate Change Response Centers (CSCs) to develop adaptation tools for
use by DOI managers.162 It also called for the development of Landscape
Conservation Cooperatives (LCCs) to coordinate regional adaptation
efforts.163 With the FWS serving as primary coordinator, each LCC serves
as a conduit for interagency communication on regional landscape
conservation.164 Like its predecessor, Order 3289 imposed uniform
mandates on all DOI agencies.
In 2012, DOI included in its Departmental Manual new provisions
relating to climate change adaptation.165 The provisions commit DOI to
integration of climate change adaptation strategies into its policies,
planning, programs, and operations, including park, refuge, and public land
management; habitat restoration; species and ecosystem conservation;
water management; and land acquisition.166 The Manual specifies that DOI
will manage uncertainty through tools such as scenario planning and
adaptive management, and will promote landscape-scale, ecosystem-based
management approaches to enhance resilience and sustainability of linked
human and natural systems.167 It commits DOI to develop performance
metrics in management plans and regularly assess whether such measures
are succeeding.168 Bureau and office heads must incorporate adaptation into
planning processes, develop and implement adaptation plans, and update
decision-making processes to integrate the policy’s principles and values.169
However, DOI specified that the policy is only designed to improve its
internal management, creates no enforceable rights, and “does not alter or
affect any existing duty or authority of individual bureaus.”170
The DOI issued a Climate Change Adaptation Plan in 2013 that
recognized that “[v]ulnerabilities to climate change impacts vary widely
across the Department’s mission areas. Bureaus’ climate change adaptation
priorities and needs depend on the particular vulnerabilities of their mission
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and assets.”171 The plan nevertheless enunciated “guiding principles” for all
bureaus and offices. These included ensuring enhancing the ability of
ecosystems and wildlife populations to absorb change and maintain key
qualities through means such as protection and restoration of contiguous
blocks of un-fragmented habitat and enhanced connectivity among habitat
blocks.172 The plan also stated that DOI would require individual agencies
to establish adaptation-related planning priorities.173
In 2014, DOI issued a more elaborate plan, which described its
“evolving” approach to climate change adaptation.174 This plan identified
climate adaptation priorities for the three DOI land management agencies.
For the BLM, these included conducting vulnerability assessments and
strengthening landscape level planning efforts.175 For the NPS, they
included developing guidance for incorporating climate change science into
park and strategic plans and implementing those plans at the field level, and
evaluation of risk and prioritization of adaptation actions to protect facilities
and cultural and historical resources.176 For the FWS, the priorities included
facilitating sustainable landscapes through LCC-based collaborative
planning and management and developing a climate change policy
framework.177
The 2014 plan also identified five principal strategies for managing
climate risks and building resilience. One strategy is to mainstream and
integrate climate change adaptation into both agency-wide and regional
planning efforts. An example is the FWS’s efforts through LCCs and CSCs
to develop shared adaptation goals with conservation partners and develop
resilient landscape designs. As of fiscal year 2014, the design of these
efforts was underway or project activity had been initiated. 178 Another
strategy is to enforce protocols that reflect projected health and safety
impacts of climate change. One example is NPS efforts to factor sea level
rise and storm surge science into hurricane response plans for coastal parks.
Progress is again seemingly described as rudimentary: design underway or
project activity initiated.179 Yet another strategy involves updating external
171
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programs and policies (e.g., through grants and technical assistance) to
incentivize planning for and addressing climate impacts. What is striking
about all of these examples is how far from broad scale, on-the-ground
implementation all of them appear to be.
USDA began planning for climate change about a decade after DOI.
Departmental Regulation 1070-001, issued in 2011, established a USDAwide directive to integrate climate change adaptation planning and actions
into programs, policies, and operations.180 The Regulation required USDA
agencies to analyze how climate change may affect missions and program
objectives, identify necessary budgetary adjustments, and specify areas in
which legal analysis is needed to implement the Regulation.181 It also
directed agencies to consider climate impacts in long-term planning.182
Two years later, USDA issued a Strategic Sustainability Plan that
committed it to develop, prioritize, implement, and evaluate actions to
minimize climate risks.183 The plan identified nine sustainability goals, the
last of which was promoting climate change resiliency.184 By fiscal year
2014, USDA would implement agency-specific adaptation plans.185 It
would also incorporate preparedness and resilience into planning and
implementation guidelines for specific projects.186
USDA’s 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Plan noted the need for
flexibility to adapt to the uncertainty reflected in climate change
projections.187 The Plan identified five strategic goals,188 including
ensuring that the national forests are “conserved, restored, and made more
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resilient to climate change.”189 The Plan included adaptation plans by
individual USDA agencies, including the USFS’s plan,190 which is
discussed below.191
B. The National Forests
The USFS’s management of national forests entails considerable
legal adaptive capacity as a result of both flexible substantive management
goals that focus on promoting sustainable ecological function and the
integration of flexible processes for resource management. The USFS has
leveraged this substantial legal adaptive capacity to engage in the most
extensive climate-related planning of the four land management agencies
and to integrate consideration of and preparation for climate change into its
management processes.
1. Adaptive Capacity under NFMA
The USFS derives its management and regulatory authority from the
National Forest Management Act (NFMA).192 NFMA’s focus on
promoting long-term ecological sustainability and diversity as part of a
multiple-use, sustained-yield regime provides a flexible resource
management goal that is able to accommodate ecological change.
In advancing its focus on long-term productive use of national
forests, NFMA is replete with references to the need to accommodate
change in management. The statute’s very first subsection includes a
congressional finding that “the management of the Nation’s renewable
resources is highly complex and the uses, demand for, and supply of the
various resources are subject to change over time.”193 The statute
enunciates that the public interest is served by the Forest Service’s
189
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assessment of the nation’s renewable resources and periodic preparation,
review, and updating of a national renewable resource program.194 Other
indications that Congress sought to afford the USFS the tools to react to
changing conditions and needs are reflected in congressional findings that
new knowledge derived from scientific research will promote “a sound
technical and ecological base for effective management, use, and protection
of the Nation’s renewable resources,”195 and that the USFS has a
responsibility and opportunity to “be a leader in assuring that the Nation
maintains a natural resource conservation posture that will meet the needs
of our people in perpetuity.”196 NFMA also directs the USFS to maintain
on a continuing basis a detailed, comprehensive inventory of National
Forest System lands that “reflect[s] changes in conditions and identif[ies]
new and emerging resources and values.”197
Indeed, in a provision added by the Food, Agriculture,
Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990,198 NFMA specifically requires the
periodic resource assessment to include “an analysis of the potential effects
of global climate change on the condition of renewable resources on the
forests and grasslands of the United States.”199 Similarly, the 1990
amendments to NFMA require the USFS to periodically prepare and submit
to the President a Renewable Resource Program which must include
management recommendations which “account for the effects of global
climate change on forest and rangeland conditions, including potential
effects on the geographic ranges of species, and on forest and rangeland
products.”200
The USFS’s authority (and duty) to manage the forests in light of
changing conditions is also integrally woven into NFMA’s basic
management standards. The statute declares a policy that the forests be
maintained in appropriate forest cover “to secure the maximum benefits of
multiple use sustained yield management in accordance with land
management plans.”201 It requires the USFS to periodically adopt detailed
management plans for each national forest and assure that the plans
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“provide for multiple use and sustained yield of the products and services
obtained therefrom.”202 The USFS must “determine forest management
systems” in light of multiple-use and sustained-yield principles,203 as
borrowed from the Multiple-Use, Sustained Yield Act of 1960.204 The 1960
Act defines multiple use as management of the national forests so that they
are used in the combination that best meets the nation’s needs, providing
“sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to changing
needs and conditions.”205
NFMA therefore provides the USFS considerable flexibility in
determining the appropriate balance of multiple uses in its planning and
management activities.206 As indicated above, the courts have described the
multiple-use, sustained-yield standards as “breathing discretion at every
pore.”207 They also have characterized those standards as failing to provide
any guidance on how to assess agency management activities.208
Nevertheless, the NFMA imposes some substantive constraints on
agency discretion. It requires that land and resource management plans
“provide for diversity of plant and animal communities . . . in order to meet
overall multiple-use objectives” in light of the suitability and capability of
a particular national forest unit.209 Further, the multiple-use, sustained-yield
management mandate can be read to encompass management for ecosystem
health.210
Even viewed from the narrowest perspective of its role—as an
agricultural manager of timber production—sustainability and adaptation to
future conditions threatening to disrupt forest function has always been
critical to the USFS’s mission. However, the USFS has in recent years
demonstrated a much broader commitment to ecological sustainability, as
202
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reflected in its latest planning and roadless rules. The stated purpose of the
agency’s 2012 planning regulations is to produce plans that:
promote the ecological integrity of national forests and grasslands
and other administrative units of the [National Forest System
(NFS)]. Plans will guide management of NFS lands so that they
are ecologically sustainable and contribute to social and economic
sustainability; consist of ecosystems and watersheds with
ecological integrity and diverse plant and animal communities;
and have the capacity to provide people and communities with
ecosystem services and multiple uses that provide a range of
social, economic, and ecological benefits for the present and into
the future.211

Similarly, the USFS justified its 2001 regulations restricting timber
harvesting and road construction as necessary to protect the social and
ecological values and characteristics of roadless areas, whose watershed
values and ecosystem health would be at risk without immediate action.212
These commitments increase the likelihood that the USFS will take rapid
and extensive adaptation planning and implementation seriously.
The USFS’s expansive substantive legal adaptive capacity is
accompanied by its embrace of procedural legal adaptive capacity through
flexible adaptive management procedures in its planning rules. The USFS
has integrated adaptive management and similar back-end mechanisms into
and throughout its management process. The regulations, adopted in 2012,
define the planning process as an “iterative” one comprised of assessment,
plan development or revision, and monitoring.213 Indeed, one of the defects
in the 1982 planning regulations that the 2012 regulations sought to remedy
was their failure to reflect current adaptive management practices.214
Among other things, agency officials must prepare monitoring evaluations
indicating whether or not a change to management activities may be
warranted based on the new information, and use the results to inform
adaptive management of the plan area.215 Courts have endorsed the USFS’s
use of adaptive management processes in national forest management.216
Both substantively and procedurally, the USFS has ample legal adaptive
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capacity that should situate it well to respond to changing needs and
conditions arising from climate change.
2. Evaluating Adaptation Activities of the USFS
The USFS’s legal adaptive capacity has translated into the most
extensive adaptation planning and integration of adaptation into
management processes of any of the federal land management agencies. As
early as 2008, the USFS developed a Strategic Framework for responding
to climate change.217 That Framework characterized climate change as
one of the greatest challenges to sustainable management forests
and grasslands and to human well-being we have ever faced,
because rates of change will likely exceed many ecosystems’
capabilities to adapt naturally.
Without fully integrating
consideration of climate change impacts into planning and
actions, the Forest Service can no longer fulfill its mission.218

The agency recognized that many forest ecosystem services may be lost or
significantly altered if forests are not managed adaptively.219 It asserted
that “strategies based on historical or current conditions will need to be
adjusted or replaced with approaches that support adaptation to the
changing conditions of the future.”220 The agency announced its intention
to engage in “facilitated adaptation,” which would include both
anticipatory and opportunistic actions.221 The Framework established
seven goals, including understanding the environmental, economic, and
social implications of climate change;222 enhancing the capacity of forests
to adapt to climate stresses so as to maintain ecosystem services; and
integrating climate change into USFS policies, program guidance, and
communications.223 The Framework included five pages of specific
recommendations to achieve the seven goals.224
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In 2010, the USFS adopted a “performance scorecard” to be
completed annually by each unit of the NFS.225 The scorecard provides an
annual assessment of unit performance in four areas – organizational
capacity, engagement, adaptation, and mitigation and sustainable
consumption. Among the questions relating to adaptation is whether an
adaptation strategy is in place that helps incorporate resource vulnerability
into priority setting and management actions.226 By 2015, each unit should
be able to answer “yes” to seven of the ten scorecard questions.227
The next year, the USFS issued a National Roadmap for Responding
to Climate Change.228 It provided a litany of actions to facilitate adaptation
in three areas: assessment of climate risks and knowledge gaps,
engagement with employees and stakeholders, and management for
resilience.229 In each area, the Roadmap identified ongoing, immediate, and
longer-term initiatives. For example, the ongoing management actions
included treating overgrown forests to make them less vulnerable to wildfire
and insects, controlling invasive species, relocating roads and facilities to
resist floods, and reforesting land damaged by fires or weather events.230
The immediate actions included connecting habitats through measures such
as removal of impediments to the movement of species most likely to be
affected by climate change.231 Longer-term initiatives included restoring
disturbed areas by replanting stock from seed sources and species capable
of adapting to changing conditions, developing seed and plant stocks
appropriate for re-vegetation, and development of comprehensive strategies
to maintain and restore habitat connectivity.232
In 2012, the USFS issued perhaps its most forceful adaptation
initiative through its revised planning regulations.233 The regulatory
preamble identified eight overriding purposes and needs, two of which
relate explicitly to climate change: emphasize restoration of natural
225
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resources to enhance resilience; and contribute to sustainability by ensuring
that plans will be responsive and can adapt to challenges such as climate
change.234 Consistent with the Roadmap and Scorecard, the regulations
incorporate a strategic framework for adaptive management to help
determine if there are measurable changes related to climate change and
other stressors that need to be addressed.235 Most significantly, the
regulations require agency officials to take climate change into account
when developing plan components for ecological sustainability.236
Officials also must consider climate change when providing for ecosystem
services and multiple uses.237
In 2015, the USFS issued Land Management Planning Directives
that revised Forest Service Handbook and Manual provisions establishing
procedures and responsibilities for implementing the planning
regulations.238 The Directives address the role of climate change in the
planning process in greater detail than the regulations. For example, the
regulations require planners to identify and evaluate information for system
drivers of key ecosystem characteristics, including a changing climate.239
The Directives elaborate:
The Interdisciplinary Team240 should assess predominant climatic
regimes by reviewing existing information such as vulnerability
assessments and scenario planning. . . . Note that climate change
is both a system driver and a stressor. The Interdisciplinary Team
shall document the assumptions used to assess predominant
climate regimes.241

The Directives also guide agency officials in designing plan components to
sustain functional ecosystems, defined as those that sustain critical
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ecological functions over time to provide ecosystem services.242 In doing
so, planners must take into account the effects of a changing climate.243
Specific climate-related issues that may be relevant to planning and
management decisions include the effects of climate change on stream
flows that may affect the size of riparian management zones,244 changes in
occurrence of extreme storm events that may affect soil productivity,245 and
warming trends at higher elevations, which may alter the capability of some
forests to provide ecological conditions needed to maintain viable
populations of species such as the American pika.246
Some national forests have already incorporated these requirements
into specific management plans or otherwise addressed climate change.247
The 2013 Land and Resource Management Plan for the San Juan National
Forest in Colorado, for example, devotes an eight-page appendix to climate
change trends and management strategies for species and ecosystems that
are already changing.248 Other plans address climate-related impacts such
as declines in permanent snowpack that provides a water source for
wildlife249 or effects on wildlife habitat, physiology, phenology, and biotic
interactions.250 The agency has developed a template for assessing climate
change impacts and management options,251 and is applying it in revising
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land use plans.252 It has conducted vulnerability assessments at NFS units
to identify management constraints and options.253 It is also has conducted
pilot assessments in eleven national forests of potential hydrologic changes
and watershed vulnerability.254
In its 2014-2018 Strategic Plan, USDA estimated that as of 2012,
35% of national forests and grasslands were in compliance with a climate
change adaptation and mitigation strategy. Its goal was 100% compliance
by 2020.255 USDA also estimated that 58.5 million acres in the NFS were
in a desired condition to reduce catastrophic wildfire risks in 2009, a figure
it sought to increase to 60.7 million acres by 2018.256 By the end of fiscal
year 2013, 49% of NFS units had met the performance scorecard target.257
Specific initiatives also had made progress. For example, studies on how
to conserve genetic diversity in the face of climate change were completed
or underway.258 A climate-sensitive version of the agency’s Vegetation
Simulator Model was implemented for the western conterminous United
States.259 Resource constraints such as insufficient field resources,
however, slowed the pace of land use plan revisions,260 restoration work
needed to increase resilience,261 treatment of forests infested with western
bark beetles,262 and conservation of genetic diversity.263
The USFS clearly has prioritized climate change adaptation,
required that forest plans address it, established fairly specific guidance and
252
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tools to assist in planning, and begun to apply the guidance at the unit level.
If not for budgetary constraints, the agency would have done even more.264
Though historically not an agency particularly associated with proactive
ecological conservation, its relatively substantial legal adaptive capacity
makes it less surprising that the USFS would be the resource agency most
engaged in climate change adaptation planning and implementation.265
The 1990 amendments to NFMA266 long ago added specific
mandates that renewable resource assessments include an analysis of the
effects of climate change on resource conditions.267 These statutory
changes and the USFS’s periodic Renewable Resource Program
recommendations may account for the effects of climate change on forest
and rangeland conditions,268 have driven the agency’s efforts to address
climate change. There is no evidence to support that hypothesis, however.
The 2010 Strategic Framework, the 2011 National Roadmap and, most
notably, the 2012 planning regulations and accompanying preamble all lack
even a single reference to these statutory provisions relating to climate
change.269 Indeed, the preamble to the planning regulations explains that
provisions to meet the purpose and need of the environmental impact
statement prepared in connection with the regulations “but not otherwise
required by NFMA, were included . . . to ensure that plans would be
responsive to the challenges of climate change . . . .”270 Instead, the agency
attributed the planning requirements relating to climate change to the
statutory multiple-use mandate.271 The agency’s expansive substantive
264
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legal adaptive capacity appears to be a more important factor in explaining
its progress on planning and managing for climate change.
C. The Public Lands
In contrast with the USFS, the BLM has been much slower off the
mark in engaging in climate change adaptation on the public lands it
manages. The BLM has legal adaptive capacity that is analogous to that
available to the USFS, and its parent agency, DOI, began establishing
mechanisms for integrating climate change adaptation considerations into
its planning and management before USDA did. As discussed in Part IV,
we attribute the BLM’s hesitation to other factors.
1. Adaptive Capacity under FLPMA
FLPMA, which is the chief statute governing BLM management of
the public lands,272 imposes on the BLM essentially the same multiple-use,
sustained-yield mandate that governs USFS management of the national
forests. FLPMA lacks the multitudinous references to the need for
adjustments in management policies and approaches in response to
changing needs and conditions found in NFMA, and it does not explicitly
refer to climate change. Like NFMA, however, it dictates management on
the basis of multiple-use, sustained-yield principles,273 and it requires the
BLM to apply those principles through the adoption and implementation of
land use plans called resource management plans.274 Moreover, FLPMA’s
definition of “multiple use,” like the one that governs the USFS under the
1960 Multiple-Use, Sustained Yield Act,275 refers to management that
“provide[s] sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to
changing needs and conditions.”276 The courts have construed the multipleuse, sustained-yield mandate to vest broad discretionary authority in the
BLM, just as they have for the USFS under NFMA.277
FLPMA also incorporates very flexible ecological goals. The
statutory definition of “multiple use” refers to “harmonious and coordinated
FLPMA defines “public lands” as lands owned by the United States and managed by
the BLM, with certain exceptions. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1702(e) (2006).
273
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management of the various resources without permanent impairment of the
productivity of the land and the quality of the environment.”278 BLM lands,
however, are not subject to any requirement akin to the NFMA’s diversity
requirement; the only definitive BLM planning standards require the
designation and protection of areas of critical environmental concern and
compliance with pollution control laws.279 The statute requires that the
BLM, in managing the public lands, “by regulation or otherwise, take any
action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the
lands.”280 In addition, the BLM must manage areas being studied for
possible designation as wilderness so as “to prevent unnecessary or undue
degradation or to afford environmental protection.”281
The lack of procedural specificity in FLPMA has likewise allowed
the BLM to resort to procedural devices of its choosing. Within limits, the
courts have often approved the BLM’s use of adaptive management
measures, just as they have for the USFS.282
FLPMA thus creates a flexible core mission for the BLM to manage
the public lands to promote the sustainability of ecological resources in
service of consumptive and other utilitarian goals, recognizing that the
particular ecological constituents that promote this objective are likely to
change over time. This malleable mandate, coupled with the agency’s use
of procedurally adaptive techniques such as adaptive management, appears
to afford the BLM legal adaptive capacity perhaps even greater than the
USFS’s under NFMA. It ought to provide the BLM with the tools needed
to manage in the face of climate change.
2. Evaluating the BLM’s Adaptation Activities
Yet, the BLM’s climate-related efforts appear to pale in comparison
to the USFS’s initiatives. The BLM claims to have embarked on a
“landscape approach” comprised of five interconnected components: rapid
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ecoregional assessments (REAs),283 ecoregional direction, field
implementation, monitoring for adaptive management, and science
integration.284 REAs map areas of high ecological value and gauge
potential climate risks. Ecoregional direction seeks to use the results of the
REAs to identify management priorities and priority areas for conservation
and development, and provide a “blueprint” for implementing these
priorities. Field implementation will put management strategies identified
in ecoregional direction into practice on the ground, such as by amending
resource management plans or revising mitigation measures for authorized
land uses. Monitoring will provide information for adaptive management
that refines implementation actions. Finally, science provided by the DOI’s
CSCs and other sources should facilitate implementation of measures to
adapt to climate impacts.285
Unfortunately, these efforts largely are not yet reflected in
significant management activities, such as resource management plans or
project approvals, and some of the actions taken are short on substantive
analysis of climate change impacts or strategies for responding to them. A
47-page report issued by the BLM in 2010 on “lessons learned” from
ecological assessment processes included only two vague references to
climate change, and one of those was in the literature review portion of the
report.286 Another report, issued in 2011, describing the BLM’s
Assessment, Inventory and Monitoring Strategy (AIM) developed in
connection with the monitoring component of the landscape approach
referred to climate change just once.287
Consistent with the cursory nature of these reports, the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded in May 2013 that the
BLM lacked strategic direction to help guide field and district offices in
addressing climate change.288 The GAO opined that the BLM’s ecoregional
assessments eventually “may prove useful in addressing climate change
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adaptation.”289 It also noted with approval the BLM’s pending adoption of
a field guide for vulnerability assessments.290 The GAO noted BLM’s plans
to develop a high-level climate adaptation strategy by the end of the summer
2013,291 but as of February 2015, no such strategy had been publicly
released. The GAO also reported that the BLM had not provided guidance
to its offices on how to incorporate climate change adaptation into natural
resource planning and management, although agency guidance on issues
such as drought and invasive species may indirectly help resource managers
address climate change.292
In addition, the little work BLM is doing on climate change has
mostly been limited to gathering information on resource vulnerabilities
rather than developing management strategies. The GAO found that some
of REAs are important first steps. The Colorado Plateau REA, for example,
notes that invasive species such as cheatgrass and tamarisk have the
potential to shift their ranges in response to climate change.293 The agency
considered multiple climate projections in preparing the REA,294 and the
resulting report includes a “climate change scenario” section which
revealed that prairie dogs and sage grouse are at risk of very high climate
stress by 2060, while big sagebrush and pinyon-juniper woodland also are
likely to be adversely affected.295 The REA poses a series of management
questions, several of which focus on climate change.296 Other completed
REAs include similar discussion.297 Such analyses are steps to assist BLM
resource managers account for climate change, but they are assessments
rather than decisions that reflect on-the-ground management decisions.298
Though still inchoate, the BLM has issued a wildfire management
strategy that recognizes a variety of stressors, including climate change, that
289
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are exacerbating fire risks and sketches out the broad parameters of an
approach to manage those risks. In January 2015, Interior Secretary Jewell
issued an order establishing a Rangeland Fire Task Force to reduce the
likelihood and severity of rangeland fires and commit resources to
preparation for and response to such fires.299 The Task Force issued a report
later that year outlining a recommended strategy for managing wildfire risks
in the 2015 and 2016 Western fire seasons, although many of the actions
discussed are not scheduled for completion until well after that time or are
framed in broad generalities.300 Nonetheless, the report provides that the
strategy should consider “risks from climate change, fire, invasive species,
development, and other change agents,”301 and the task force identified
focus areas for science and research, one of which is the “[i]mplications of
climate change, grazing and other land uses.”302 A few of the climaterelated recommendations are more specific, such as the development of a
strategy to create a long-term seed bank to ensure conservation of
germplasm to promote climate resilience and rangeland health.303 If
adopted by the Secretary, the strategy represents a series of early steps in a
recommended approach to managing climate-related threats to ecosystem
health.
Significantly, in marked contrast to the USFS’s planning
regulations, as of mid-2015, the BLM’s land use planning regulations did
not include a single reference to climate change.304 Neither did the BLM
Manual provisions on land use planning.305 In 2014, the BLM did unveil
299
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its “Planning 2.0” initiative,306 which seeks to create a more dynamic
planning process and plan across landscapes and at multiple scales.307
Adoption of changes to the agency’s planning regulations do not seem
imminent, however. In any event, the agency’s Summary Report on the
initiative made only one minor reference to climate change, noting that
public comments urged the agency to designate in resource management
plans restoration, innovation, and observation zones.308 Even on this issue,
the report provides no indication of how the agency might respond.
At the individual unit level, adaptation planning by the BLM also
appears embryonic. A 2013 draft RMP from the Billings Field Office
identified as a goal management of “diverse, healthy landscapes to be
resilient to stresses, including climate change, and incorporate flexible
management actions to adjust to changing climatic conditions.” 309 It also
endorsed the use of adaptive management.310 The draft plan is devoid of
specific management components, however, providing only that the agency
will “[p]rovide for flexible, adaptive management that allows for timely
responses to changing climatic conditions” and that planning officials
should “[a]djust the timing of BLM-authorized activities as needed to
accommodate long-term changes in seasonal weather patterns.”311 Other
recently released draft plans include similarly vacuous prescriptions.312 In
its budget request for fiscal year 2016, the BLM noted the need to support
landscape-level conservation to address the impacts of stressors such as
what roles weather conditions played in the establishment of existing vegetation, and what
those influences will be in the future. Id. § 5000-1.12B(2)(b)(3). The provisions on
National Landscape Conservation System Management (Part 6100), Conducting
Wilderness Characteristic Inventory of BLM Lands (Part 6310), Considering Lands with
Wilderness Characteristics in the BLM Land Use Planning Process (Part 6320),
Management of BLM Wilderness Study Areas (Part 6330), Management of Designated
Wilderness Areas (Part 6340), and even Fire Planning (Part 9211), all fail to include any
mention of climate change.
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climate change. The budget purportedly sought to broaden the scope of
BLM programs to enhance understanding of and preparation for climate
change.313 Yet, of the $1.2 billion increase sought over the previous year’s
enacted budget, only $10 million (or less than one percent) was specifically
earmarked for these purposes, an amount that does not appear to prioritize
climate-related initiatives.314
D. The National Wildlife Refuges
As compared to other federal land management agencies, the FWS
has engaged in a relatively moderate level of adaptation planning and
integration of adaptation measures into refuge management. This pace and
extent of adaptation is congruent with the moderate level of legal adaptive
capacity that the FWS enjoys in managing the national wildlife refuges.
1. The FWS’s Adaptive Capacity
The goals and orientation of the National Wildlife Refuge System
Improvement Act (NWRSIA)315 allow the FWS a moderate level of
flexibility in selecting management goals and the means to achieve them,
though the FWS has interpreted the NWRSIA to require an emphasis on
historical preservation. The FWS must administer the NWRS “for the
conservation, management, and where appropriate, restoration of the fish,
wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats within the United States for
the benefit of present and future generations of Americans.”316 It must “plan
and direct the continued growth of the System in a manner that is best
designed to accomplish” this mission, or, significantly, “to contribute to the
conservation of the ecosystems of the United States.”317 In addition, the
NWRSIA directs the FWS to manage each individual refuge to fulfill not
only the mission of the System as a whole, but also the specific purposes
for which that refuge was established.318 Accordingly, the goals of
individual refuges may vary depending on the specific purposes of that
refuge. In this sense, the goals of NWRS management are more
individually tailored and fragmented than that of other federal lands.319
313
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Considering only the language of NWRSIA, this management
regime is not necessarily restricted to preserving historical ecological
conditions.
The FWS’s mandates include “conservation” and
320
“restoration,” terms that might be interpreted as envisioning retention or
re-creation of historical conditions. However, the statutory definition of
“conservation” is broader than historical preservation. The term means “to
sustain and, where appropriate, restore and enhance, healthy populations of
fish, wildlife, and plants.”321 The statutory reference to conservation of
ecosystems322 arguably reinforces the FWS’s duty to conserve function, not
a pre-existing resource mix or state. Moreover, the statute authorizes the
use of management methods and procedures “associated with modern
scientific resource programs, including propagation and transplantation.”323
The reference to transplantation seems potentially broad enough to cover
the movement into a refuge of species that were never there before. The
statute directs the FWS to “ensure that the biological integrity, diversity,
and environmental health of the System are maintained. . . .”324 While
maintenance seems geared toward retention of the status quo, what the FWS
is supposed to maintain is biological integrity and environmental health, not
particular historical conditions. The FWS also has a little-used emergency
power to “temporarily suspend, allow, or initiate any activity… if the
Secretary determines it is necessary to protect the health and safety of the
public or a fish or wildlife population.”325
Professor Fischman asserts that the mandate to ensure maintenance
of the Refuge System’s biological integrity, diversity, and health is “the
most ecologically informed, of any legislative criterion for public land
management. Congress clearly intended that the refuges should protect
nature in accordance with the latest scientific understanding.”326 He argues
that the 1997 amendments to the FWS’s organic statute reflects “a
heightened emphasis on integrity as an overarching management goal.”327
Although he concedes that the meaning of the key statutory provision328 is
established for individual refuges.”). Nonetheless, direct conflict between individual unit
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“not self-evident,”329 by closely parsing the statutory text and analyzing
statutory context and legislative history, he concludes that the reference to
integrity reflects “the emerging consensus meaning of ‘integrity,’ [which]
encompasses all of the pieces now understood to constitute functioning
landscapes,” and that this provision has the potential to equal the NFMA’s
diversity provision as a strong constraint on agency discretion.330
Accordingly, notwithstanding a conservation-oriented mandate, the
NWRSIA provides the FWS some ability to manage wildlife refuges in
ways that allow modification of ecological constituents over time. As a
result, taken alone the statute appears to provide the agency a significant
amount of substantive legal adaptive capacity in its management of refuges.
That flexibility could be a valuable management tool as climatic changes
make existing refuges less compatible with certain historically occurring
species and more harmonious with others.
However, even Professor Fischman acknowledges that “[t]he
temporal dimension of integrity and health addresses the dynamic variation
in ecological processes through the limits of historic conditions.”331
Moreover, a review of the FWS’s internal rules interpreting Congress’s
delegation reveals a reluctance by the FWS to recognize or take full
advantage of its available statutory substantive legal adaptive capacity. The
FWS’s current interpretation of the biological integrity provision is
contained in the agency’s manual for refuge management, which serves as
policy guidance to FWS officials.332 It defines biological integrity as
“[b]iotic composition, structure, and functioning at genetic, organism, and
community levels comparable with historic conditions, including the
natural biological processes that shape genomes, organisms, and
communities,” and environmental health as “c]omposition, structure, and
functioning of soil, water, air, and other abiotic features comparable with
historic conditions, including the natural abiotic processes that shape the
environment.”333 Id (emphasis added). The agency defines “historic
conditions” as “[c]omposition, structure, and functioning of ecosystems
resulting from natural processes that we believe, based on sound
professional judgment, were present prior to substantial human related
changes to the landscape.”334 These definitions reflect a commitment to
329
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preserve historic conditions which the statutory text arguably does not
compel.
The agency’s treatment of non-native species points in the same
direction as these manual definitions. The FWS has customarily been, and
still remains, largely focused on promoting native species and ecosystems
where they have historically existed. It has interpreted the NWRSIA, for
example, to allow non-native introductions, but only in rare situations. Both
the FWS’s Manual335 and Refuge Manual336 address non-native
introductions. The FWS Manual generally prohibits introduction of
“species on refuges outside their historic range.”337 However, an exception
is made for circumstances in which “such introduction is essential for the
survival of a species and prescribed in an endangered species recovery plan,
or is essential for the control of an invasive species and prescribed in an
integrated pest management plan.”338 Even when undertaking such nonnative introductions, the FWS states that it strives “to minimize unnatural
effects and to restore or maintain natural processes and ecosystem
components to the extent practicable without jeopardizing refuge
purpose(s).”339 The FWS Refuge Manual is also restrictive, barring
reintroduction of naturally extirpated exotics, exotic birds, or species
anticipated to be invasive or to cause detrimental effects on the receiving
area.340 Other provisions consistently emphasize that the primary
ecological goal of the refuges is promoting historical conditions.341
Moreover, some individual units may have individual unit purposes that
seek to promote particular preexisting species.342 The FWS has at times
decided to “privilege (sometimes outdated) individual [unit] purposes over
335
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the superb (modern) system ones to a greater extent than that required by
legislation.”343
This focus on historical fidelity had the advantage of serving as a
clear and concrete counterweight to those interests more focused on
maximizing refuges for hunting uses.344 However, the FWS’s focus on
promoting native species and ecosystems where they have historically
existed also may be in part a product of its dual role as refuge manager and
principal implementer/enforcer of the Endangered Species Act (ESA)345 for
land and freshwater species.346 The FWS’s implementation of the ESA has
traditionally been heavily based on maintaining historical baselines,
protecting species in their pre-existing range, and conserving and restoring
native ecosystems and native species.347 For example, the ESA’s extensive
protections only apply if a species is listed as “endangered,” which is
expressly defined as occurring only if the species is “in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range.”348
Moreover, the ESA heavily focuses its conservation and recovery
activities in historically native areas. FWS regulations implementing the
ESA make clear that non-native introduction is supposed to be very rare,
and the FWS goes to great pains to limit such introductions. ESA
regulations allow the introduction of an experimental population “outside
of the species’ current natural range,” but generally only “within its
probable historic range.”349 The only circumstance in which an introduction
outside of a species’ historical native range is allowed is in “the extreme
case that the primary habitat of the species has been unsuitably and
Id. at 94, 94 n.63 (providing specific examples). Individual refuge unit purposes “may
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irreversibly altered or destroyed.”350 The FWS, in adopting this regulation,
emphasized that nonnative introductions should be extremely rare,351 and
the agency in fact has only allowed non-native introductions in two
circumstances, both of which were supposed to be temporary.352 In doing
so, the FWS affirmed the importance of focusing conservation efforts on
promoting species where they existed historically and minimizing exotic
species.353 Perhaps as a result of this dual role, the FWS’s management of
the NWRS has also been heavily influenced by promoting historical
fidelity.354 Thus, though the NWRSIA may allow the FWS to actively
manage national wildlife refuges away from historical conditions, the FWS
rules and policies have cabined this substantive legal adaptive capacity to a
moderate degree.
The NWRSIA affords the FWS procedural legal adaptive capacity
that is of a piece with the capacities of the USFS under NFMA and the BLM
under FLPMA. The statute requires the FWS to adopt a conservation plan
for each refuge or complex of refuges and revise the plan “as may be
necessary,” but at least once every fifteen years.355 Notably, the statute
directs the FWS to revise a plan “at any time if [it] determines that
conditions that affect the refuge or planning unit have changed
significantly.”356 It must then manage the refuge in a manner consistent
with the plan.357 The statute establishes procedural requirements for the
planning process, but they do not appear to be particularly onerous,
encompassing the usual inter-agency coordination and public participation
opportunities.358 The NWRSIA also provides a boilerplate general grant of
rulemaking authority to the FWS in its management of the refuges.359
The FWS has also embraced iterative decision-making processes.
Of the nine goals of refuge planning it identified after adoption of the
NWRSIA, one is providing a basis for adaptive management.360 One study
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found, however, that the FWS’s recently adopted land use plans tend to lack
specific criteria for success, making it difficult for refuge managers to know
whether and how to adjust management actions on the basis of information
generated by monitoring.361 The FWS nevertheless has ample procedural
legal adaptive capacity, both under the NWRSIA and its own planning
regulations, to pursue the changes needed to effectively respond to climate
change.
2. Evaluating the FWS’s Adaptation Activities
In light of this moderate level of substantive legal adaptive capacity,
it makes sense that the FWS has taken significant steps to engage in climate
change adaptation, but has mostly confined these measures to conceptual
organizational initiatives, vulnerability assessments, and vague goals that
have yet to lead to concrete integration of climate change adaptation into
land management. Other than serving as the primary facilitator for the
DOI’s LCCs,362 the FWS’s primary climate change adaptation activities in
its capacity as manager of the national wildlife refuges has been drafting the
National Fish, Wildlife, and Plants Climate Adaptation Strategy finalized in
2012.363 The 2012 Strategy establishes seven broad climate adaptation
goals: (1) enhancing the capacity for effective management; (2) supporting
adaptive management; (3) increasing knowledge on impacts and responses
of fish, wildlife and plants; (4) increasing awareness and motivating action
to safeguard fish, wildlife, and plants; (5) reducing non-climate stressors to
help ecosystems adapt; (6) conserving habitat to support healthy fish,
wildlife, and plant populations and ecological functions; and (7) managing
species and habitats to protect ecological function and provide sustainable
cultural, subsistence, recreational, or commercial use.364 Encouragingly,
the last two goals suggest a possible re-thinking of conservation approaches.
The Strategy explains that the goal is not to keep current conservation areas
as they are, but rather to ensure that a network of habitat conservation areas
maximizes the chances that the majority of species will have sufficient
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habitat somewhere.365 However, this broad policy document has yet to
affect any existing management processes used by the FWS.
Until recently, most of the agency’s focus has been on facilitating
assessments of the potential effects of climate change on NWRS resources.
However, in 2013 the agency adopted a new chapter in the FWS Manual
that established overarching FWS policy and staffing responsibilities on
climate change adaptation.366 These manual provisions tend to be couched
in broad generalities, such as establishing a policy “to effectively and
efficiently incorporate and implement climate change adaptation measures
into the Service’s mission, programs, and operations”; use the best available
science in coordinating appropriate adaptive responses; integrate adaptation
strategies into all aspects of policy, planning, programs, and operations;
work with partners and LCCs; “deliver landscape conservation actions that
build resilience or support the ability of fish, wildlife, and plants to adapt;
and monitor populations and habitats to assess the impacts of management
strategies in the face of climate change.367
Segments of new FWS guidance do attempt to grapple with the
difficulties of managing climate change, including the challenge of
promoting historical fidelity despite a changing climate. In July 2014, the
FWS published guidance for resource managers across agencies on scenario
planning for managing uncertainty, including from climate change.368 Later
that year, it issued generalized guidance to NWRS managers that illustrates
the challenges the FWS faces in managing for substantial changing
conditions despite its internal constraints on substantive legal adaptive
capacity.369 The guidance provides examples of potentially appropriate
management actions to adapt to climate change, such as revision of land
acquisition plans and restoration of acquired lands to enhance resilience.370
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Id.
FWS MANUAL 056 FW 1 (July 22, 2013), http://www.fws.gov/policy/056fw1.html.
367
Id. § 1.6. Another new Manual chapter, issued in 2014, established the FWS Climate
Adaptation Network to guide the agency “to enhance preparedness, adaptation, and
resilience in the face of the impacts of climate change and its interaction with non-climate
influences” on fish, wildlife, plants, and ecosystems. FWS MANUAL 056 FW 2 (June
20,2014), http://www.fws.gov/policy/056fw2.html.
368
FWS, CONSIDERING MULTIPLE FUTURES: SCENARIO PLANNING TO ADDRESS
UNCERTAINTY
IN
NATURAL
RESOURCE
CONSERVATION
(2014),
http://www.fws.gov/home/feature/2014/pdf/Final%20Scenario%20Planning%20Docume
nt.pdf. The guidance provides several examples of scenario planning. Id. at 89, 101, 129,
137.
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FWS, PLANNING FOR CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM,
http://www.fws.gov/refuges/vision/pdfs/PlanningforClimateChangeontheNWRS.pdf.
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Id. at 9. In describing several case studies, the guidance provided examples of possible
management actions to address particular problems. See, e.g., id. at 40-41 (construction of
deep wetlands); id. at 49 (strategic fire management).
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Importantly, the FWS continues to assert that the framework for
fulfilling the NWRSIA’s mandate to maintain biological integrity, diversity,
and environmental health is to maintain “historic conditions,” but it
reframes historical conditions to focus on preexisting processes rather than
particular constituents of the ecosystem. It defines “historic conditions” as
“[c]omposition, structure, and functioning of ecosystems resulting from
natural processes that we believe . . . were present prior to substantial human
related changes to the landscape.”371 The agency added that its goal is “to
induce management for natural conditions and with natural processes, using
historic conditions to help identify such conditions and processes.”372 The
FWS expressly acknowledged that “[t]he concept of ecological integrity
and the cohesion of ecological integrity policies are challenged and
undermined by anthropogenic climate change.”373 It also noted that
managers have “a certain degree of latitude and flexibility in responding to
climate change,” and that “prospective adaptation” may be appropriate to
“’fit’ ecologically with climate change trajectories.”374 The FWS thus
continues to treat retention of historical conditions as the key substantive
goal, but it is attempting to reinterpret a fixed historical baseline to allow
more flexible application as ecological conditions change.
Despite this activity, relatively little of this guidance has found its
way into refuge management plans—the core management regime for
national wildlife refuges. A 2014 study found that many NWRS units lack
land use plans that meaningfully address climate change adaptation.375
Only 73 of the 185 refuges for which comprehensive conservation plans
(CCPs) were completed between 2005 and 2011 even mentioned
prescriptions for climate change.376 Coastal refuges were most advanced,
integrating planning for rises in sea level, but many refuges failed to
consider sufficiently the spread of harmful parasites and diseases and the
Id. at 14. As Professors Ruhl and Salzman have argued, “There is no other way to
manage for historic conditions than to use a historic baseline.” Ruhl & Salzman, supra
note 12, at 18. The FWS’s frame of reference extends from 88 to 1800 AD. Id. at 14.
372
Id.
373
Id.
374
Id. The FWS also issued in 2014 a progress report on its implementation of the 2012
Climate Adaptation Strategy describing projects in which the FWS has begun to implement
some of the 2012 Strategy’s recommendations. FWS, NATIONAL FISH, WILDLIFE &
PLANTS CLIMATE ADAPTATION STRATEGY, TAKING ACTION: A PROGRESS REPORT 5
(2014), available at http://www.wildlifeadaptationstrategy.gov/pdf/Taking-Actionprogress-report-2014.pdf.
375
See Fischman, et al., supra note 9, at 993. Cf. Archie et al., supra note 14 (finding that
the FWS “may be the farthest along” of the four land management agencies in
incorporating climate change adaptation in its land use planning, based on surveys and
interviews conducted in 2011 (before the USFS amended its planning regulations) in three
western states).
376
Id. at 994. Later plans were more likely to address management actions than earlier
ones. Id.
371
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potential increase in wildfires.377 Of those that prescribe adaptation
measures, most focused on continued monitoring and assessment or
persisted in the same conservation activities in which refuges engage to
maintain resilience generally.378 The plan prescriptions generally did not
meet the FWS’s own criteria that prescriptions be specific, measurable,
achievable, results-oriented, and time-fixed.379 Scenario planning, which
can describe plausible futures using quantitative or qualitative data, was not
evident in the plans.380 The study concludes that the CCPs adopted between
2005 and 2011 increased the extent to which they described climate-change
impacts,381 but did not consistently respond to those impacts with
prescriptions for adaptive responses to monitoring results.382
The agency’s commitment to pursuing concrete measures to
facilitate adaptation fortunately appears to be increasing. In September
2014, the FWS incorporated a new Strategic Growth Policy in the FWS
Manual. Among its objectives are ensuring that future growth of the refuge
system furthers “an ecologically-connected network of public and private
lands that are resilient to climate change and support a broad range of
species under changed conditions.”383 Even though this reference to
changed conditions appears in a portion of the Manual governing new
additions to the refuge system, it may reflect an emerging broader
recognition that movement away from a solely historic focus is necessary
in an era of disruptive climate change.384
In addition, in its fiscal year 2016 budget request, the FWS
identified climate change adaptation as a priority goal. In particular, it
indicated that by September 2015, the Interior Department “will
demonstrate maturing implementation of climate change adaptation . . .
377

Id. at 993.
Id. at 994 (“Although the majority of plans prescribed monitoring, much less than half
indicated an intent to act on the results of monitoring or described specific actions that
should follow from monitoring results.”).
379
Id.
380
Fischman, et al., supra note 9, at 997.
381
See also Meretsky & Fischman, supra note 361, at 1418 (calculating proportion of CCPs
completed between 2005 and 2011 that addressed various climate-change threats).
382
Fischman, et al., supra note 9, at 1003. At the same time, however, the study postulates
that “the CCPs tend to be more current than plans for other public land systems and are
therefore more likely to address climate change.” Id. at 994. That assessment, however,
relates to plans prepared before the 2012 amendments to the USFS planning regulations
described above. See supra notes 233-237 and accompanying text. As Professor Fischman
has noted elsewhere, “the prescriptive sections [of CCPs] are the engines that generate real
management actions.” See also Meretsky & Fischman, supra note 361, at 1423.
383
FWS, FWS MANUAL 602 FW 5, § 5.2 (SEPTEMBER 4, 2014),
http://www.fws.gov/policy/602fw5.html.
384
See id. § 5.5A(1) (noting the increasing importance in planning and directing the growth
of the Refuge System of recognizing the “[u]nparalleled changes related to climate change
and non-climate stressors”).
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when implementing strategies in its Strategic Sustainability Performance
Plan.”385 The agency plans to track progress on a quarterly basis to consider
the incremental level of accomplishment achieved in development of
policies or processes, or the number of “deliverables” or completed
projects.386 The strategic goals include mainstreaming and integrating
climate change adaptation into agency-wide and regional planning actions,
ensuring that agency principals demonstrate commitment to adaptation
efforts through internal communications and policies, ensuring that
workforce protocols reflect projected health and safety impacts of climate
change, constructing or modifying facilities and infrastructure with
consideration for potential climate impacts, and updating external programs
and policies to incentivize planning for and addressing the impacts of
climate change.387 The FWS also requested budget increases for specific
activities linked to climate change adaptation, including fish passage
improvements, ecosystem restoration, and development of adaptive
science.388
In sum, the FWS has engaged in a moderate level of climate change
adaptation planning, which has recently accelerated as the agency has
completed CCPs. The NWRSIA and the FWS’s interpretive regulations
provide the FWS with some substantive legal adaptive capacity that may be
useful in adapting to climate change, even if not as much as that provided
by the statutes that govern management of the multiple use lands. The FWS
also has committed to the use of adaptive management (and, to a lesser
extent, scenario planning), thereby affording itself procedural legal adaptive
capacity, though the absence of meaningful metrics has detracted from the
value of these iterative processes.
Nevertheless, the agency’s evaluation of the threats to refuge
resources posed by climate change has by and large not yet translated into
specific management prescriptions, even in most recently adopted CCPs.
Moreover, the FWS’s adaptation efforts have been restrained, at least until
very recently, by a fundamental focus on promoting ecological historical
fidelity, so that it arguably has not taken full advantage of the substantive
legal adaptive capacity that its organic statute provides. The agency may
have begun to remove these self-imposed shackles, as its Strategic Growth
Policy and most recent budget request seem to indicate. Resource
constraints may have limited the FWS’s progress in incorporating
adaptation goals into plans and management actions, and may continue to
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS AND
PERFORMANCE
INFORMATION,
FISCAL
YEAR
2016
AT
EX-19,
http://www.fws.gov/budget/2015/FY2016_FWS_Greenbook.pdf.
386
Id.
387
Id. at EX-19 to EX-20.
388
Id. at EX-11, ES-16 (California Bay Delta restoration), SS-3.
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do so even if the agency does more fully shift away from a focus on historic
preservation.389
E. The National Parks
The NPS has undertaken even less climate change adaptation
planning and integration of adaptation measures than the FWS in managing
the National Park System. The limited adaptation activity is again
consistent with the System’s fairly limited substantive legal adaptive
capacity due to its primary focus on promoting historical conditions.
1. The NPS’s Adaptive Capacity
The NPS must manage the National Park System under the National
Park Service Organic Act’s core preservation mandate to “conserve the
scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to
provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means
as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”390
Like the FWS, the NPS “is primarily a nature preservation agency.”391
Although the NPS has broad discretion in interpreting its statutory
authority, 392 it is constrained in the ways it can use that authority to address
climate change. Climate change is causing and will continue to cause
fundamental ecological changes from prior conditions, creating tension
with the Organic Act’s historical preservation mandate.393
The NPS has long interpreted the Organic Act to require it to focus
on protecting historical conditions and preexisting biota.394 Established
NPS interpretations stipulate that the NPS should take a historical
preservationist approach to existing natural resources in national parks. If
389

See GAO, supra note 111, at 44-45.
16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). See also U.S. NAT’L PARK SERV., MANAGEMENT POLICIES § 1.4.3
(2006), available at http://www.nps.gov/policy/MP2006.pdf [hereinafter NPS
MANAGEMENT POLICIES] (The fundamental purpose of the national park system,
established by the Organic Act . . . , as amended, begins with a mandate to conserve park
resources and values.”). The NPS defines “conserve” to mean “to protect from loss or
harm. Historically, the terms conserve, protect, and preserve have come collectively to
embody the fundamental purpose of the NPS—preserving, protecting and conserving the
national park system.” Id. at 1565 (Glossary).
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Keiter, supra note 146, at 955.
392
See Davis v. Latschar, 202 F.3d 359, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
393
Camacho, supra note 12, at 1426 (arguing that prioritizing preservationism and
minimizing human interaction with natural systems “is incongruent with the dynamic
nature of ecosystems and the pervasiveness of the human-nature relationship, particularly
in light of modern anthropogenic climate changes”).
394
See NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 390, § 4.4.1 (“The National Park Service
will maintain as parts of the natural ecosystems of parks all plants and animals native to
park ecosystems.”); id. § 4.1 (“[P]reserving park resources and values unimpaired is the
core or primary responsibility of NPS managers.”).
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any management strategy or adaptation measure could lead to the
impairment of park resources or values, it cannot be approved.395 As such,
the NPS often engages in active steps to promote or restore preexisting
ecological conditions.396 This focus on preserving historical conditions is
congruent with the NPS’s other programs directed at historic preservation
of the built environment. These include administering National Historical
Parks, National Historic Landmarks, National Heritage Areas, the National
Register of Historic Places, and historic preservation grants and historic
rehabilitation tax credits.397
Paired with that historical goal is a secondary presumption that the
agency must protect existing natural resources from human activity or
management,398 as well as a strong preference for relying on “natural”
processes for protecting and restoring pre-existing native species.399 Yet
even then historical preservation remains the primary goal;400 the agency
has declared that it will not intervene in natural biological or physical
processes except “to restore natural ecosystems functioning that has been
disrupted by past or ongoing human activities.”401 If biological or physical
processes have been altered in the past by human activities, active
management may be appropriate, but the goal of such action is
395

Id. § 4.1.
See id. § 4.4.2.2 (stating that the NPS “will strive to restore extirpated native plant and
animal species . . . .”); id. § 4.4.2.5 (“In altered plant communities managed for a specified
purpose, plantings will consist of species that are native to the park or that are historically
appropriate for the period or event commemorated.”); id. § 4.4.2.3 (“The Service will
survey for, protect, and strive to recover all species native to national park system units
that are listed under the [ESA] . . . . [T]he Service will inventory other native species that
are of special management concern to parks . . . and will manage them to maintain their
natural distribution and abundance.”); id. § 4.4.1.2 (“The Service will strive to protect the
full range of genetic types (genotypes) of native plant and animal populations in the
parks.”).
397
See NORMAN TYLER ET AL., HISTORIC PRESERVATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS
HISTORY, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICE 33 (2ND ED. 2009).
398
See NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 390, § 4.1 (“In cases of uncertainty as to
the impacts of activities on park natural resources, the protection of natural resources will
predominate.”). Cf. id. at 36 (“The Service recognizes that natural processes and species
are evolving, and the Service will allow this evolution to continue—minimally influenced
by human actions.”).
399
Id. § 4.4.2 (“Whenever possible, natural processes will be relied upon to maintain native
plant and animal species and influence natural fluctuations in populations of these
species.”).
400
In fact, some NPS policies conflate historical preservation with non-intervention by
purporting to promote native species through minimizing human management. See id.
§ 4.4.1.2 (“The Service will strive to protect the full range of genetic types (genotypes) of
native plant and animal populations in the parks by perpetuating natural evolutionary
processes and minimizing human interference with evolving genetic diversity.”).
401
Id. § 4.1. Additional limited justifications for such intervention are congressional
authorization, emergencies that pose risks to human life and property, and as needed to
protect other park resources, human health and safety, or facilities. Id.
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fundamentally historical preservationist: “to restore them to a natural
condition or to maintain the closest approximation of the natural condition
when a truly natural system is no longer attainable.”402 Legislation creating
individual NPS units may reinforce the agency’s focus on maintaining
historic conditions.403
The NPS’s approach to its statutory management mandate generally
functions to minimize the possibility of proactive management to promote
future ecological function. NPS managers have the discretion (and
sometimes obligation) to reintroduce extirpated populations of vulnerable
native species.404 NPS managers generally are prohibited from introducing
non-native species except when needed to meet a specific management
need, all feasible measures are taken to reduce the risk, and the introduced
species is closely related to an extirpated native species or improved variety
of a native species where the natural variety cannot survive current, humanaltered environmental conditions.405 NPS managers are expected to actively
seek to remove any non-native species.406
This focus on promoting historical fidelity provides limited
substantive legal adaptive capacity for NPS managers to engage in proactive
adaptation measures. The tension between fostering active climate change
adaptation strategies that seek to advance future ecological health and the
NPS’s fundamentally historical preservation goals is obvious.407 The
402

Id. § 4.1.
See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 79a (2006) (stating purpose of creating Redwood National Park
as “preserv[ing] significant examples of the primeval coastal redwood (Sequoia
sempervirens) forests and the streams and seashores with which they are associated for
purposes of public inspiration, enjoyment, and scientific study”); id. § 160 (stating that the
purpose of establishing Voyageurs National Park “is to preserve, for the inspiration and
enjoyment of present and future generations, the outstanding scenery, geological
conditions, and waterway system which constituted a part of the historic route of the
Voyageurs who contributed significantly to the opening of the Northwestern United
States”). The historic preservation focus is even more explicit for units such as national
historical parks. See, e.g., id. § 282 (describing the purpose of San Juan Island National
Historical Park as “interpreting and preserving the sites of the American and English camps
on the island, and of commemorating the historic events that occurred from 1853 to 1871
on the island in connection with the final settlement of the Oregon Territory boundary
dispute”).
404
Id. § 2.3.4 (“Implementation plan details may vary widely and may direct a finite project
(such as reintroducing an extirpated species . . .”); id. § 4.4.1 (“The Service will
successfully maintain native plants and animals by . . . restoring plant and animal
populations in parks when they have been extirpated by past human-caused actions”); id.
§ 4.4.2.3 (stating that the NPS will “reestablish extirpated populations as necessary to
maintain the species and the habitats upon which they depend”).
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Id. § 4.4.4.1.
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Id.
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But cf. Keiter, supra note 9, at 334 (arguing that the non-impairment mandate of the
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agency is not similarly saddled with low procedural legal adaptive capacity,
however. NPS policies encourage the “appropriate” use of adaptive
management in general management plans for park units408 as “a means for
providing flexibility in the face of changing natural conditions.” 409 In
addition, NPS policies appear to leave agency officials considerable
flexibility in determining the appropriate nature and extent of public
participation in agency planning endeavors.410 They also leave decisions
about the frequency of general management plan revisions largely to agency
discretion.411 The processes for implementation of general management
plan provisions are even more amorphous than the ones that apply to plan
adoption.412
2. Appraising the NPS’s Adaptation Activities
The NPS has engaged in even more modest climate change
adaptation activities in managing the National Park System than the FWS.
NPS actions have primarily focused on developing science and data on the
possible effects of climate change and seeking to educate the public about
climate change’s effects. The agency promoted better monitoring of
ecological responses to climate change413 and distributed information about
climate change effects.414 It has begun compiling data on sea level changes
and storm surges that may be useful in crafting hurricane response plans for
coastal parks in the Southeast and Northeast Regions.415

protecting the ecological health of national parks over other considerations in the event of
a conflict”).
408
The Organic Act mandates the adoption of general management plans “for the
preservation and use of each unit of the National Park System.” 16 U.S.C. § 1a-7(b) (2006).
409
NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 390, § 2.3.4.
410
Id. § 2.3.1.5 (“Public involvement strategies, practices, and activities will be developed
and conducted within the framework of civic engagement.”).
411
Id. § 2.3.1.12 (stating that if conditions remain substantially unchanged, deferring
review of existing plans beyond 10 to 15 years would be “acceptable”).
412
See id. § 2.3.4.
413
E.g., NPS, Enhanced Monitoring to Better Address Rapid Climate Change in HighElevation
Parks:
A
Multi-Network
Strategy,
http://science.nature.nps.gov/im/units/gryn/monitor/climate_change.cfm;
Monitoring
Ecological
Response
to
Climate
Change,
http://science.nature.nps.gov/im/units/gryn/monitor/climate_change.cfm.
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E.g.,
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and
USGS,
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(CVI),
http://woodshole.er.usgs.gov/project-pages/nps-cvi/ (including maps of vulnerable coastal
areas that quantify future physical changes on shorelines due to sea level rise).
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See NPS, Coastal Change Response Program, Sea Level Change and Storm Surge
Projections, http://www.nps.gov/subjects/climatechange/upload/Coastal-20Adaptation20Project-20Brief-20Nov2013.pdf.
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The NPS’s most prominent climate change adaptation initiative to
date has been its 2012 Climate Change Action Plan.416 The plan outlined
criteria for incorporating climate change considerations into NPS operations
and described how NPS managers might anticipate future conditions.417 It
listed eight high-priority areas of emphasis, but virtually all were either
modest, “business-as-usual” initiatives or vague and inoffensive
commitments. These include: (1) to enhance workforce climate literacy;
(2) to engage youth and their families; (3) to develop effective planning
frameworks and guidance; (4) to provide climate change science to parks;
(5) to implement the Green Parks Plan; (6) to foster robust partnerships; (7)
to apply appropriate adaptation tools and options; and (8) to strengthen
communication.418 The agency noted the need to “rethink traditional
planning process” in light of climate change, but the document was devoid
of specifics.419 Likewise, the discussion of appropriate adaptation tools
provided as examples “listening sessions” with NPS employees, pilot
adaptation planning processes that connect vulnerability assessments and
scenarios to park planning, decision frameworks for navigating resource
adaptation options and practices, and a national interpretive plan for climate
change.420 These measures may provide a necessary underpinning for
future unit-specific management decisions to deal with climate change, but
they are couched in much more general terms than the efforts of the other
federal land agencies. The plan promised a substantive revision in 2014.421
As of mid-2015, however, NPS management policies on Park System
Planning do not refer to climate change even once.422
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Id. at 7.
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Park System Planning, http://www.nps.gov/policy/mp/chapter2.htm. Neither did
Director’s
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Impact Analysis, http://www.nps.gov/policy/DOrders/RM12.pdf. Director’s Order #13A,
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At the unit or regional level, the agency is developing climate
change adaptation strategies, but many remain inchoate and unspecific.423
For example, the NPS Intermountain Region released a 2012 report that
merely stated that the Region was working on a handbook to refine
adaptation strategies.424 Some parks seem to have advanced a little further.
Officials at Glacier National Park, for example, have engaged in research to
establish baseline measures of species abundance and distribution to detect
changes in populations of at risk species such as pika. Park officials have
also begun planting trees in new habitats, managing invasive plants, and
restoring native vegetation.425 They indicated that they had no current plans
to revise the park’s general management plan because they deemed it an
adequate management tool, even though it does not directly address climate
change.426 They did indicate that they would develop a “foundation plan”
describing the park’s purpose, significant resources, and planning needs
which “likely” will address climate change.427 Efforts to implement
specific responses to climate change at Glacier seem to be the exception
rather than the rule, however.428
The NPS’s adaptation efforts, like those of the other agencies, have
suffered from resource limitations. In fiscal year 2011, the NPS was
allocated $10 million for adaptation activities. That figure dropped to $3
million the next year.429 Efforts to address climate-related threats to park
resources at Glacier National Park, for example, have suffered due to lack
of adequate funding for monitoring, vulnerability assessments, and
responses to insect infestations.430 For fiscal year 2016, the NPS requested
of how priority resource management issues can be used to provide important direction to
the structure of an inspection and maintenance program. Id. at 13.
423
The NPS has conducted climate change scenario planning workshops focused on
training, research, or the role of adaptation in decision making or strategic plans. See
USGCRP, SYNTHESIS, supra note 8, at 50.
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NPS, CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN REPORT: INTERMOUNTAIN REGION, at 33 (2013),
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at
http://greatnorthernlcc.org/sites/default/files/documents/nps_ccar_2013_9.pdf.
425
GAO, supra note 111, at 48.
426
Id. at 50.
427
Id. The NPS has begun to devise strategies to address climate change in preparing its
National Long Range Transportation Plan, and is working on “foundation documents”
describing priority issues and planning needs, which are supposed to be completed for all
parks by 2016. It is also preparing a “State of the Park” report for each NPS unit, which
will incorporate information on historical climate observations and projections. See
USGCRP, SYNTHESIS, supra note 8, at 50-51.
428
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Id. at 51. This constraint is not limited to the NPS. See USGCRP, SYNTHESIS, supra
note 8, at vi (“Federal agencies are making significant progress in climate change
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$16.4 million for climate change-related activities (out of a total of $213.4
million in targeted programmatic increases for all NPS activities),
representing an increase of $13.5 million over the enacted budget for
2015.431 Of that amount, $3.5 million would be to implement resiliencybuilding natural resources projects, assist planning efforts, help agency
communications with the public, and collaborate with other agencies and
academic in designing science-based resiliency-building projects in the
parks. An additional $10 million would support partnerships with nonfederal entities on projects to increase landscape resilience to extreme
weather events and the challenges posed by wildfire, flooding, and
drought.432
F. Federal Wilderness Areas
Wilderness is a special designation Congress overlays on parts of
already existing federal lands. The federal agency that manages the land
before Congressional designation is charged with administering the area
specifically as wilderness.433 Because wilderness areas were established
primarily to minimize active human management and secondarily to
promote historical conditions, they generally have the least legal adaptive
capacity of all federal conservation lands.434 A prohibition on active
resource management severely restricts management alternatives in
response to the effects of climate change. Moreover, an historical baseline
for whatever management occurs is likely to create a conundrum if climate
change precludes retention of or return to that baseline. Unsurprisingly,
therefore, wilderness lands have been subject to virtually no climate change
adaptation planning or incorporation of climate change concerns into its onthe-ground management by any of the federal land agencies.
1. Adaptive Capacity under the Wilderness Act
The Wilderness Act of 1964435 is not primarily concerned with
promoting ecological health. Areas designated by Congress as official

adaptation, although lack of financial resources has slowed implementation of climatefocused activities.”). But cf. id. at viii (“The number and quality of adaptation efforts that
have evolved during a period of declining Federal budgets are encouraging, signaling that
adaptation has moved from conceptual to real.”).
431
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Glicksman, supra note 265, at 448-49.
434
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wilderness must be protected above all to preserve their natural conditions
and wild character. The Act defines “wilderness” as:
[A]n area where the earth and its community of life are
untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not
remain. [It is] an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its
primeval character and influence, without permanent
improvements or human habitation, which is protected and
managed so as to preserve its natural conditions and which . . .
generally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of
nature, with the imprint of man’s work substantially
unnoticeable.436

Federal agencies must ensure that wilderness areas are administered to
“leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness” and
“so as to preserve [their] natural conditions.”437
The objectives of the Wilderness Act appear to be limited to either
minimizing human management (wildness preservation) or active
management to maintain or restore historical conditions (historical
preservation). On the one hand, the statute could be construed to prohibit
substantial active management.438 Alternatively, it could be understood to
require active agency management to ensure that human activities do not
interfere with the statutory goals of preserving wilderness character and
natural conditions.439 The Act implicitly contemplates some level of
temporary, ancillary, and insubstantial human interference.440 As such, it is
not completely opposed to human interaction with and management of
wilderness areas. In a few instances, the Act provides explicit authorization
for active management. It allows the USFS, for example, to take necessary
measures “in the control of fire, insects, and diseases.”441
The statute and judicial interpretations, however, do not provide
definitive guidance on how much active management is generally allowed

436

Id. § 1131(c).
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See Wilderness Soc’y., 316 F.3d at 923-24 (discussing these alternative interpretations).
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Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 629 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9 th Cir.
2010) (concluding that Congress did not intend “a museum notion of wilderness’); Izaak
Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Kimbell, 516 F. Supp. 2d 982 (D. Minn. 2007) (concluding
that the duty to preserve wilderness character may extend beyond wilderness boundaries).
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See 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2006) (emphasis added) (excluding only “permanent
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or required in wilderness areas.442 Eric Biber and Elisabeth Long contend
that the Wilderness Act provides significant discretion for agencies to
engage in active management, stating that “the vast majority of
management options are available to management agencies in wilderness
areas.”443 Nonetheless, even their analysis found that some of the more
active management strategies are not allowed in wilderness and that the
other strategies that might be allowed could be subject to “some procedural
and substantive hoops.”444 The statute might allow active management of
wilderness, but its express language indicates an agency may do so only in
furtherance of the preservation of pre-existing wilderness character and
natural conditions. As such, agencies in charge of wilderness preservation
may not rely on robust activities primarily oriented toward promoting future
ecological function at the expense of historical fidelity.445
Regardless of the exact scope of the land management agencies’
authority to actively manage to preserve wilderness character, climate
change makes achieving both wildness preservation and historical
preservation goals increasingly costly or impossible. It also pits the
Wilderness Act’s tandem objectives of passive management and historical
preservation increasingly against each other, as it will be impossible to
concurrently leave ecosystems alone and keep things as they were.446 More
significantly, climate change makes each goal increasingly at odds with
promoting ecological health.447 Wilderness areas thus have the least
substantive legal adaptive capacity of any federal conservation lands. They
also have the least procedural legal adaptive capacity, with minimal
integration of adaptive management or other flexible processes into
wilderness management protocols.448
In Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2003)
(en banc), one of the few reported cases considering if active management of wilderness is
permissible, the court addressed whether a fishery enhancement project was allowed in a
wilderness area. The initial Ninth Circuit panel considered the permissible level of human
interference in wilderness areas. See Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 316
F.3d 913, 924 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that “[w]hile the wilderness must be ‘protected’
so that its natural processes dominate, it also must be ‘managed’ so that human activities
from outside the area do not interfere unduly”). The ultimate en banc decision, however,
sidestepped this issue, concentrating instead on the project’s violation of the Wilderness
Act’s prohibition on commercial enterprises. Wilderness Soc’y, 353 F.3d at 1067.
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Camacho, supra note 12, at 1435.
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See Craig, supra note 12, at 18 (urging “an across-the-board shift in legal objectives,
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BLM, FWS and NPS wilderness regulations and policies do not refer to adaptive
management. See Wilderness Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 78,358 (Dec. 14, 2000) (codified
at 43 C.F.R. part 6300 (2013)); FWS, Wilderness Stewardship, 610 FWS 1; NPS,
Wilderness Preservation and Management; NPS, Director’s Order #41, Wilderness
Stewardship (May 13, 2013). But see Wilderness Stewardship Desk Guide: Management
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2. Adaptation Activities in Wilderness
Congruent with this incompatibility between wilderness goals and
climate change, the agencies charged with implementation of the
Wilderness Act have engaged in the least amount of climate change
adaptation planning and proactive adaptation measures in their respective
wilderness lands. When faced with ecological risks from climate change,
wilderness managers appear to avoid engaging in active measures that
would promote ecological health.
USFS, BLM, and NPS wilderness management policies fail to even
refer to climate change.449 The one agency that has staked out a position,
the FWS, seems committed to a non-interventionist approach that may not
bode well for its ability to nimbly and effectively respond to climate-related
threats.
Wilderness preservation allows refuge managers to hedge their
bets against the possibilities of inaccurate climate change
projections and experimental management techniques that could
lead to unintended consequences. . . .
However, the congruence of wilderness preservation and
ecological integrity is not always perfect or absolute, because in
designated wilderness there is also the need to avoid manipulative
management to the extent possible. This is challenging to
managers who attempt to maintain natural species assemblages for
purposes of ecological integrity, but find it difficult to accomplish
without hands-on management. Most controversial wildlife
management activities result from the need to balance the ideals
of natural and non-natural manipulated conditions. . . .
However, in the context of climate change, the nonmanipulation ideal of wilderness offers one distinct advantage
over the natural conditions ideal. The non-manipulation ideal is
stable and clear in any context, whereas anthropogenic climate
change results in confusion about the appropriateness and
techniques for maintaining natural conditions. . . . In such cases,
the non-manipulation ideal tilts the scales toward leaving species
and community evolution to take its own course. . . .450
Practices for Wilderness in the National Forests 85 (March 2010) (describing wilderness
managers’ use of adaptive management).
449
See USFS, Wilderness Stewardship Desk Guide: Management Practices for Wilderness
in the National Forests 85 (March 2010); BLM, Wilderness Management, 65 Fed. Reg.
78,358 (Dec. 14, 2000) (codified at 43 C.F.R. part 6300 (2013)); NPS, Wilderness
Preservation and Management; NPS, Director’s Order #41, Wilderness Stewardship (May
13, 2013).
450
FWS, PLANNING FOR CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM
70-71 (emphasis added).
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To date, agencies with wilderness management duties have done
little to adapt to the effects of climate change in wilderness areas. For
example, on Isle Royale National Park in Lake Superior, the wolf
population has been reduced to a record low of one pack with eight
individuals. In the past, wolves from the mainland introduced new genes
into the isolated population by migrating to the island over the frozen lake.
Climate change has decreased ice bridges that allow such migrations, and
these bridges are not expected to form after 2040. Ostensibly to promote
wilderness values of passive management, the NPS has not intervened.451
One wilderness advocacy group opposes genetic rescue, even with the
threat of genetic and harmful trophic cascades. It asserts that wilderness
conservation should not include active management because wilderness in
national parks must be kept “untrammeled.”452 This approach appears to be
representative of how the land management agencies are preparing for
climate-related threats to wilderness areas.
The agency that appears to have done the most to accommodate
wilderness management policies to climate change is the USFS, but even
its actions are of limited scope. In 2012, the USFS Climate Change
Resource Center published a report on wilderness and climate change.453 It
recognized the incongruity between the Wilderness Act’s “hands-off”
approach to management and maintaining “natural conditions” in light of
climate change.454 It also argued for the need to redefine what it means to
maintain and protect natural conditions to include active management.455
Yet even this analysis is merely exploratory. No agency, including the
USFS, has demonstrated a sustained effort to consider how if at all to
incorporate strategies for adapting to the extensive effects of climate change
on valued wilderness resources.
IV. LEGAL ADAPTIVE CAPACITY
CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION

AND

OTHER FACTORS SHAPING

As Part III illustrates, there appears to be a significant relationship
between legal adaptive capacity and the extent to which federal land
management agencies have engaged in climate change adaptation. With
one key exception, the range of progress in adaptation largely reflects the
adaptive capacity of the various governing laws/regulations to address
dynamic ecological change. Of the land management systems considered
in Part III, wilderness areas are subject to the legal regime that is most tied
to non-interventionist management structures.
Because wilderness
management requirements are least congruent with active management, the
451
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agencies that manage wilderness have very little substantive legal adaptive
capacity. Wilderness areas to date are virtually climate change adaptation
free, and the inaction in the face of climate-related threats to wilderness
areas reflects that limited capacity.
The national parks are managed under a statute that reflects a
historical preservation priority and, to a somewhat lesser extent, a
presumption against active management. The NPS Organic Act and NPS
policies interpreting and applying it primarily focus on keeping preexisting
resources where they are and keeping out those not there before. It is as if
the agency took a snapshot of each park as it existed at some point in the
past when the agency regarded it as well serving statutory purposes, and has
used that photograph as a blueprint for future management actions so that
conditions can be preserved as they were. This focus on historical and
wildness preservation, however, is in tension with managing for future
ecological conditions. The NPS’s previous management strategy may have
worked well for much of the past century, when ecological conditions
varied within a relatively narrow range, but it is not well suited to promoting
long-term ecological health in the context of unprecedented ecological
stress resulting from global climate change.
Not surprisingly, the NPS, which therefore lacks substantive legal
adaptive capacity, also has not responded with alacrity to the threats posed
to the national parks by climate change. As at least a partial consequence
of this limited legal adaptive capacity, the NPS has developed broad
planning goals in its action plan, but few concrete adaptation strategies. The
agency’s limited ability or reluctance to accommodate the need to depart
from a historical preservation orientation and a hesitation to engage in active
management may be hindering, and is certainly not facilitating, its efforts
to get a meaningful adaptation program underway.
Federal wildlife refuge goals provide moderate flexibility to manage
as needed for future ecological conditions. The NWRSIA’s mandate to
ensure maintenance of the biological integrity and environmental health of
the national wildlife refuges affords the FWS more expansive substantive
legal adaptive capacity than that provided by either the Wilderness Act or
the NPS Organic Act.456 Consistent with our thesis that the scope of an
agency’s substantive legal adaptive capacity affects its ability to integrate
climate change adaptation into management policies and programs, the
FWS has taken climate change adaptation planning and implementation
further than the NPS or any of the agencies in their management of
wilderness areas. Its actions include establishing agency-wide adaptation
goals and proposed adaptation requirements for new acquisitions.457
Moreover, the FWS’s commitment to meaningful analysis of and responses
456
457

16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(B) (2006).
See supra notes 364-374 and accompanying text.
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to the effects of climate change on the wildlife refuges appears to be
accelerating.
Nevertheless, the FWS’s interpretations of the NWRSIA as
requiring it to rely on a historical management approach has constrained its
ability to move forward on its climate change adaptation commitments.
Moreover, the NWRSIA’s commitment to decentralized goal setting, in
which place-based individual refuge goals take precedence over systemwide objectives,458 further limits the program’s legal adaptive capacity.
This fragmented approach to goal-setting is of particular concern in an era
of climate change; if shifting climatic conditions radically alter the
ecological characteristics of a refuge, the original individualized purpose
for creating that refuge are particularly vulnerable to not being
achievable.459 Consistent with this level of substantive legal adaptive
capacity, the FWS has only moderately adapted its management decisions
to climate change.
As indicated above, DOI’s 2014 climate change adaptation plan
enunciated the priorities of the NPS and the FWS in preparing to manage
for climate change.460 The plan’s identification of the need for development
of NPS guidance for incorporating climate change science into planning and
developing a FWS climate change policy framework is particularly striking.
DOI has demanded these initiatives of its component agencies since at least
2001. That these fundamental tasks remain unaccomplished after thirteen
years reflects poorly on the status of climate change adaptation policy
efforts at both agencies.
The USFS and the BLM both have broader substantive legal
adaptive capacity to adjust to changing conditions than the NPS or the FWS.
In the past, this flexibility has allowed these agencies to be less
conservation-oriented. However, it also provides the most adaptive
capacity to manage the effects of climate change on vulnerable ecological
resources. The USFS has taken advantage of this capacity, most notably by
requiring development of responses to climate-related threats in the 2012
planning rule, as well as in early efforts to craft management approaches for
individual projects that take account of climate change. The U.S. Global
Change Research Program has singled out the USFS for developing
systematic accountability for developing adaptation strategies, requiring
field units to assess resource sensitivity to climate change and develop
adaptation responses (as reflected in the USFS Climate Change
458
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Performance Scorecard), and adopting regulations that require that climate
change be considered in development of target conditions and management
actions in restoration planning.461
In contrast, the BLM has taken no concrete steps other than
conducting some vulnerability assessments.
FLPMA’s goals and
delegations of management authority afford the BLM substantive legal
adaptive capacity in its management of the public lands that is analogous to
the USFS’s adaptive capacity under NFMA. In addition, the BLM seems
as committed to the use of adaptive management processes as the USFS.
Yet, the BLM has lagged behind its sister multiple-use agency in its climate
change adaptation planning and implementation.
The absence of clear and enforceable directives to exercise legal
adaptive capacity is a potential factor in explaining the difference between
BLM and USFS adaptation. The criteria for development and revision of
land use plans are much more amorphous under FLPMA than under
NFMA,462 arguably affording the BLM that much more freedom to
determine appropriate management policies and uses for particular parcels.
As one court put it, the BLM planning process acts as nothing more than a
“course filter.”463 FLPMA’s mandate “to prevent unnecessary or undue
degradation” of the public lands464 could easily be construed to require the
BLM to take affirmative steps to tackle climate-related threats to the public
lands with the potential to cause resource degradation. The BLM, however,
has at times interpreted this mandate narrowly,465 and the judicial
interpretation has significantly weakened if not eliminated this antidegradation duty.466
461

USGCRP, SYNTHESIS, supra note 8, at 62.
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Whether regulatory adaptation is permissive or mandatory may
affect legal adaptive capacity and the extent to which an agency actually
uses it to address changed conditions. Thus, the permissiveness in the
BLM’s legal framework toward adapting its substantive goals may account
for its failure to translate delegated adaptive authority into adaptation
activities as extensively as the USFS has done under NFMA’s imperatives
to adjust its management strategies as uses, demand for, and supply of forest
resources change.467
Although the focus of this Article is on substantive legal adaptive
capacity, two aspects of procedural adaptive capacity bear mentioning as
possible explanations for the BLM’s relatively poor record on adaptation
compared to that of the USFS. First, agency organizational structure may
have played a role in the delayed BLM response to climate change. The
BLM has a more decentralized decision-making structure,468 which may
have contributed to its delays in prioritizing climate change adaptation for
two reasons. Local officials may have greater discretion to choose not to
respond to changes in policy direction at the top,469 leading to a less
widespread inculcation of the importance of adaptation throughout the
agency.470 Second, a local decision-making locus may have made BLM
resource managers more susceptible to capture by proponents of
consumptive and extractive uses important to local economies.471 The
interests of these parties do not necessarily align with the changes in

natural environment. If the Bureau appropriately balances those uses
and follows principles of sustained yield, then generally it will have
taken the steps necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation.
Id. at 76.
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managers “to manage their district or state like a ‘fiefdom’ “); 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN,
supra note 131, § 7:8 (citing descriptions of the BLM as “highly decentralized” and as a
“line-and-staff organization”).
469
BLM land managers reported in 2011 that lack of specific agency direction was the
most important barrier to adaptation planning. Archie et al., supra note 14. The percentage
of BLM employees identifying this factor as a barrier to adaptation planning was higher
than for any of the other three agencies. Id. at Fig. 7.
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In contrast, the congressional practice of dictating USFS decisions line by line in the
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USFS officials. See 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 131, § 7:11 (citing John H.
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of local Western communities, some agency employees harbor the suspicion (shared by
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concerns”).
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management approaches that may be needed to respond effectively to
climate change.472
The second aspect of procedural adaptive capacity that may be
relevant relates to the manner in which the two multiple-use agencies factor
scientific considerations into their decisional processes. The NFMA
integrates scientific input into the USFS’s decision-making processes in a
way that FLPMA does not. The NFMA requires the Secretary of
Agriculture to appoint a committee of scientists not employed by the agency
to provide scientific and technical advice to assure that “an effective
interdisciplinary approach” is used in the adoption of USFS planning
regulations.473 The committee has induced the agency to pursue
management approaches that are responsive to changed conditions.474
FLPMA does not institutionalize the role of scientific input into BLM
decision-making processes in a similar manner, and, according to at least
some observers, the result has been that the agency sometimes pays less
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of the refuge.” Fischman, supra note 83, at 555. The NPS’s science arm suffered a similar
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increased effectiveness”). The level of scientific input into NPS management decisions
dropped sharply after those shifts. Id. at 424-25.
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attention to current science than it should, in part because of the influence
of consumptive users referred to above.475
The difference between the climate adaptation track records of the
USFS and the BLM may also be the result of factors that have nothing to
do with either the substantive or procedural legal adaptive capacities of the
two agencies.476 The USFS has long had a top-down management culture,
which places a premium on following policy directions established by
agency leadership.477 Relatedly, one possibility is that the BLM historically
has a less robust tradition of natural resource protection even as compared
to the USFS. The USFS, for example, has long played a leadership role in
wilderness preservation that the BLM has not.478 Similarly, it is possible
that there has been a mistaken belief that natural resources on BLM lands –
such as range – are not as vulnerable to a changing climate as USFS lands,
or that, even if they are, they are less ecologically valuable and therefore
not worth devoting as many resources to save. Some have referred to the
BLM lands as “the lands no one wanted,” having been unclaimed and
unreserved during the federal government's disposition of the public
domain, and “many viewed them as a vast arid wasteland of little use to
anyone.”479 The wooded areas and spectacular scenery characteristic of
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some national forest tracts, on the other hand, may more readily prompt the
conclusion that adaptation to preserve ecological function is critical.480
The BLM lands do have ecological value, however, and one of
FLPMA’s goals is management that protects ecological and environmental
values.481 Moreover, even if some BLM lands may be less ecologically rich
than other federal lands, this may change (or need to change) as the climate
does. The nearly 248 million acres of BLM lands—the largest of the federal
land agencies482—may be essential components of a resilient approach to
resource management as climate conditions shift and biota need to migrate
to more compatible locations. Finally, degree of historical commitment to
resource preservation is not itself determinative—the NPS and, to a
somewhat lesser extent, the FWS, have lagged in their management
responses to climate change notwithstanding strong resource protection
traditions. Perhaps the Forest Service’s more robust response to the
challenges of climate change stems from the highly visible adverse impacts
already being experienced in the national forests from drought, heat, insect
infestation, and disease.483 The threats that climate change poses to some
of the national parks and wildlife refuges, such as glacial melting and
saltwater intrusion from sea level rise,484 are more gradual, more
geographically confined, and perhaps, at least to some, more contestable as
to causation.
Resource constraints also may contribute to the BLM’s less
impressive performance.485 Congress provided significantly higher levels
of discretionary funding to the USFS than the BLM between 2001 and 2014.
The USFS received $63.5 billion dollars in discretionary spending,
compared to $21.3 billion for the BLM for the same period,486 even though
the BLM manages more acreage.487 This differential seems consistent with
a longer pattern of congressional failure to adequately fund the BLM, which
may have forced it to prioritize some management goals and initiatives at
Cf. Glicksman, supra note 265, at 459 (noting that the national forests “tend to feature
more spectacular scenery and opportunities for hiking and camping in wooded areas” than
the public lands).
481
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the expense of others.488 It would not be surprising if the BLM were to
respond to resource shortages by moving climate change adaptation, a task
with which it is relatively unfamiliar, to the back burner.
Regardless of the persuasiveness of these potential alternative
explanations, the salient point here is that differences between the two
agencies do not seem linked to significant differences in their substantive
legal adaptive capacities. Substantive legal adaptive capacity may therefore
be a necessary but not sufficient precondition to effective land management
agency responses to climate change. Without sufficient substantive legal
adaptive capacity, even agency personnel committed to accommodating
climate change will be unable to do so in a manner that conforms to rigid,
inapt goals. If, however, statutory goals are expansive and malleable
enough to permit management shifts to meet the challenges of climate
change, an agency’s recalcitrance to make those shifts can stymie
significant progress in implementing adaptation measures.
V. IMPROVING FEDERAL LAND LEGAL ADAPTIVE CAPACITY
Climate change poses significant challenges to management of all
the major federal natural resource systems. It would have been surprising
if the management agencies had responded to these challenges with equal
alacrity and enthusiasm, notwithstanding government-wide presidential
decrees to anticipate climate change. If differences were to exist, one might
have expected the land systems most closely tied to resource protection—
the national parks, the national wildlife refuges, and official wilderness
areas—to best reflect integration of climate change adaptation
considerations into management decisions. That is not what has happened.
Climate change adaptation has been almost entirely absent from wilderness
management, the NPS has not moved much beyond information-gathering
and establishment of planning frameworks, and the FWS has gone
somewhat but not considerably further than the NPS. Instead, the agency
that is most advanced in its commitment to climate change adaptation is the
USFS, an agency maligned for much of its history as a captured agency
concerned more with maximizing timber cuts than protecting ecological
forest health. The only agency whose climate-related posture is neither
notably beyond nor behind what its past management priorities might have
predicted is the BLM.
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See, e.g., Archie et al., supra note 14 (quoting BLM employee, who identified as
significant resource-based barriers to additional progress in climate change adaptation
because the agency lacks “the capacity to fund adaptation projects, or to hire the staff to
participate in the projects.”); see also George Cameron Coggins & Parthenia Blessing
Evans, Multiple Use, Sustained Yield Planning on the Public Lands, 53 U. COLO. L. REV.
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We suggest that these largely counterintuitive results stem from the
four agencies’ relative legal adaptive capacities. Although scholars have
recognized the role of legal adaptive capacity in the pursuit of statutory
goals, their focus on procedural adaptive capacity has obfuscated another,
perhaps more important, factor—substantive legal adaptive capacity. The
disparate responses of the land management agencies to climate-related
threats demonstrates the critical role that factor plays in an agency’s
response to changed circumstances such as those caused by global climate
change. The statutory regimes that govern management of official
wilderness and the national parks are rooted in historical and wildness
preservation goals that impair agencies’ ability to meet climate-related
threats. The FWS’s organic statute seems more amenable to addressing
climate change given its emphasis on protection of ecological function, but
the FWS has to a certain degree tied its own hands by interpreting its
mandate as oriented toward historical preservation. The USFS and the
BLM operate under mandates that afford them ample authority to adjust
management strategies as resource conditions change, positioning them
well to prepare for climate-related impacts. The USFS has taken advantage
of this substantive legal adaptive capacity, setting an example for the other
agencies. The BLM has not, for reasons that may include agency culture,
organizational structure, and resource limitations.
Given these differential responses, and in light of the pervasive
threats that climate change poses to all federal lands systems, we urge
refashioning the standards, statutory and otherwise, that govern federal
lands to enhance the land management agencies’ substantive legal adaptive
capacity. The reforms we envision would remove the shackles that
currently create a mismatch between the relatively constrained legal
adaptive capacity of some agencies and their duties to achieve applicable
management goals in a changing world.
The fact that the USFS, which has expansive adaptive capacity, has
done the most to date to integrate climate change considerations into its
policies and programs does not suggest that the only or best way to enhance
the adaptive capacity of the other agencies to manage climate change is
through adoption of multiple use, sustained-yield goals for all land systems.
Instead, we favor as the touchstone the promotion of ecological health on
all federal land systems.489 Moreover, the emphasis should be on protecting
the integrity of ecosystems or essential ecological processes and functions
(such as biodiversity, carbon sequestration, water cleaning, waste
decomposition, or nutrient cycling) instead of individual species or
resources at risk because of climate change.490 The question is how to craft
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See Camacho, supra note 12, at 1407-08 (urging legal changes to permit better
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management regimes that afford the agencies adequate legal adaptive
capacity to pursue that goal without unduly sacrificing other valuable ends,
such as historical or wildness preservation, with which efforts to promote
ecological function may conflict in the climate change era.
Put differently, not all substantive legal capacity is created equal;
the flexibility of the goal is just one factor to be considered in evaluating
how much and what kind of adaptive capacity to provide. In the federal
lands context, two flexible goals might differ and have different results. For
example, a consumptive but flexible goal (such as that sometimes pursued
by the USFS and the BLM under multiple-use, sustained-yield management
standards) might be harmful to ecological health, but a flexible goal that
requires promoting future ecological health or biodiversity might be
beneficial for ecological function. Similarly, historical preservation and
wildness preservation are both rigid goals but they are very different from
each other.
To make the legal regimes governing national parks, national
wildlife refuges, and wilderness areas more responsive to climate change,
we recommend at least a partial shift away from current mandates to
premise management strategies primarily on preservation of obsolete
historical norms or non-interventionist approaches of questionable efficacy
that increasingly may be harmful to ecological health. The use of historical
baselines, while useful in some contexts (such as historical preservation),
limit government’s adaptive capacity in a dynamic world to conserve
healthy ecological resources. Similarly, a hands-off posture is increasingly
likely to disrupt the functioning of climate-challenged systems in ways that
interfere with continued ecological health. These changes may come in the
form of statutory amendments to the Park Service Organic Act or the
Wilderness Act to require primacy for promoting long-term ecological
health, articulated through the protection of specific ecological processes.
In some cases, however, the changes could originate administratively. The
NWRSIA’s substantive goals and mandates are flexible enough to
accommodate a shift by the FWS away from its past emphasis on
maintenance of historical baselines and toward protecting the integrity of
ecosystems or essential ecological processes and functions.491
For a discussion of the FWS’s commitment to preserving historical baselines, see supra
notes 335-354 and accompanying text. Fischman and Adamcik argue that, in addressing
climate-related threats, the FWS’s management objectives for the national wildlife refuge
system “can no longer rely solely upon past population levels and habitat relationships or
even upon heretofore known species assemblages and biotic communities.” Robert L.
Fischman & Robert S. Adamcik, Beyond Trust Species: The Conservation Potential of the
National Wildlife Refuge System in the Wake of Climate Change, 51 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1,
26 (2011). Instead, they posit that “[a] core complementary focus” on protecting trust
species and “ecosystem function and services, ecological integrity, and natural systems” is
better suited to providing a robust response to climate change.” Id. at 27. “The adaptation
491
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The changes we recommend in the governing mandates of the
multiple use agencies would not all result in an expansion of their
substantive legal adaptive capacity, which is already ample. Rather, they
would shift from one flexible substantive mandate to another. The multiple
uses to which the national forests and the public lands are committed
include various extractive uses. These lands have mineral and renewable
resources from which the nation should continue to benefit. If multiple use
management on either land system interferes with ecological health,
however, it should yield to strategies that preserve the health of the affected
lands and resources.492 One way to accomplish that would be to replace the
goal, reflected in the current definition of “sustained yield,” of maintaining
“a high-level annual or regular periodic output” of renewable resources on
the public lands493 with a goal of maintaining well-functioning ecological
processes or ecosystem services.494 Additionally, as detailed below, the
BLM’s experience suggests that a further desirable change unrelated to the
scope of its legal adaptive capacity may be to reduce or eliminate agency
discretion not to manage adaptively.495
Just as there are tradeoffs implicated by expanding procedural legal
adaptive capacity through techniques such as adaptive management,496
similar tradeoffs necessarily accompany expansion or contraction of
substantive legal adaptive capacity.497 In the federal land management
context, rigid goals that require maintaining an historical baseline or that
require non-intervention in federal lands have value. For historical
baselines, one possible set of benefits mirrors the reasons for historic
preservation law generally.498 There may be cultural, educational, aesthetic,
or economic reasons for maintaining or restoring property or resources to a
prior state, as a reminder of how things are or used to be.499 Furthermore, a
rigid historical baseline is relatively clear, and at least previously

actions commonly recommended for protected areas, such as connectivity enhancement
and protection of climate change refugia, more directly emerge from an ecological
approach than one primarily prioritizing species.” Id.
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See supra Part I.C.
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proponents may have considered it a rough but sufficient proxy for guarding
ecological health against consumptive use.500
For passive wildness preservation, many have identified
economic,501 scientific,502 psychological,503 spiritual,504 and existence
value505 from the maintenance of undisturbed landscapes. In light of the
pervasiveness of global anthropogenic climate change—making virtually
every land at least indirectly shaped by human activities506—those benefits
might more appropriately be identified as the value of maintaining less
disturbed, or at least less directly disturbed, lands. Moreover, the rigidity
of at least the strictest version of non-intervention is well-defined, providing
relative ease in its application. A baseline of minimal management also by
definition helps ensure relatively low administrative costs for management
activities.
Efforts to increase substantive legal adaptive capacity by allowing
agencies to deviate from historical or wildness preservation dictates in the
face of climate change will necessarily diminish or forfeit some of these
benefits. In their analysis of the Wilderness Act, Eric Biber and Elisabeth
Long queried whether the procedural and substantive barriers to active
management “might still be too much of a constraint to allow for effective
adaptation to climate change.”507 However, stating that they “do not think
so,” they argue that the costs from the Wilderness Act’s constraints on legal
adaptive capacity are worth the “substantial benefits to restraint and passive
management for climate change adaptation—at least in the particular
context of wilderness areas.”508
Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 1, at 14 (noting that a historic baseline can provide “a clear
goal and temporal reference point”); Camacho, supra note 128, at 245-46.
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Though we agree that there undoubtedly are benefits to more passive
and reactive strategies as well as tradeoffs from more active management,
with the projected rapid and even convulsive effects of climate change we
think the scales tilt heavily toward adjusting public land laws more toward
more substantive legal adaptive capacity at the expense of rigid adherence
to historical preservation or nonintervention. Climate change substantially
increases the costs in ecological function of absolute bars and/or significant
impediments to active management strategies. Relying on inflexible
regulatory goals that emphasize stasis and/or minimal management will
severely limit the ability of resource managers to manage the detrimental
ecological effects of climate change.509 Perhaps the starkest quandary
facing an agency subject to those constraints will be choosing between
translocating endangered species to lands upon which they have never
previously existed or presiding over species extinction.510 Moreover,
climate change will increasingly render the two goals of wildness
preservation and historical preservation irreconcilable. Additionally, each
also will be increasingly incompatible with the need of promoting
ecological functions in a rapidly changing world.511 As such, we maintain
that the ecological costs of non-intervention or historical fidelity will
increasingly outweigh the precautionary or cultural benefits.
Nonetheless, the general expansion of substantive legal adaptive
capacity we favor need not, and probably should not, apply uniformly, even
to lands currently governed by historical or wildness preservation mandates.
For some landscapes, the historical and cultural benefits of historical
preservation and the lower administrative costs of wildness preservation
may trump the benefits of a more flexible, adaptive management approach.
Such an approach, for example, might be appropriate when an area is
expected to be fairly ecologically stable notwithstanding climate change, is
exceptionally pristine, or has a poorly understood ecological functions.512
For other lands, maintaining historical conditions will be increasingly costly
and even impossible. Avoiding human disturbance will almost always be
possible, but it too may generate unacceptable costs. Thus, if historical or
wildness preservation remains the goal, it should be because policymakers
decide that pursuit of that goal is worth the resulting loss of ecological
diversity and/or productivity.
509

Cf. IRIS BRAVERMAN: WILD LIFE: THE INSTITUTION OF NATURE 9-10 (Stanford Univ.
Press 2015) (arguing that climate change is among the factors making existing species
habitat less viable, so that “[i]n many cases, what conservationists refer to as natural habitat
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Camacho, supra note 128, at 181-83.
511
See Camacho & Beard, supra note 117, at 235 (urging a shift away from maintaining
historical baselines and avoiding human management and toward maximizing ecological
function in light of climatic and other changing environmental conditions).
512
Camacho, supra note 12, at 1446-47.

81

Finally, the Article’s analysis of substantive legal adaptive capacity
provides broader insights about the contours of delegated agency discretion
generally. As illustrated through the federal lands context, agency
discretion and legal adaptive capacity are related but distinct phenomena.
In the context of procedural legal adaptive capacity, there is a temptation to
equate more management flexibility with more agency discretion.513
However, a process may be flexible but still promote accountability through
constraints on when or how the agency is allowed to exercise that
flexibility.514 For example, a governing authority may compel stakeholder
participation, use of adaptive management, or the integration of clear
triggers within an adaptive management process, rather than make them
optional.515
Likewise, the comparison of BLM and USFS management in the
face of climate change illustrates that the effectiveness of substantive legal
adaptive capacity may vary depending on whether it is mandatory or
permissive. The absence of directives in the BLM’s governing legal regime
requiring the agency to adjust management strategies in response to changes
in information or circumstances may have played a role in its failure to
engage in adaptation activities. In one sense, requiring compliance with a
flexible substantive goal reduces agency discretion, but in a way that
minimizes the potential for other factors to derail effective adaptation to
change. For example, if a statute requires an agency to use its adaptive
capacity, it is less likely that the agency will respond to budgetary
constraints by deferring or giving short shrift to efforts to adapt to change
than if the agency has unconstrained discretion to take advantage of its
adaptive capacity or leave it lying dormant. Similarly, if a statute demands
that an agency take an adaptive posture, agency leadership may face less
resistance in imposing top-down directives to alter management approaches
to address novel challenges. Such directives may generate buy-in
throughout the agency even if, like the BLM, the agency has a decentralized
structure that tends to hinder changes in policy direction from the top or
deviations from traditional operating practices. Required flexibility also
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may promote accountability by providing a basis for more meaningful
judicial review.516
It therefore may be desirable to reduce an agency’s “regulatory
discretion” by precluding it from deciding not to act adaptively, even when
a change in “legislative discretion” is not needed because the agency
operates under a substantive mandate that affords it adequate flexibility to
respond to changing needs and conditions.517 Mandating the advancement
of, and periodic re-assessment against, a flexible regulatory goal—such as
the promotion of ecological health in light of changing conditions—may
maximize the chance for effective adaptation to change rather than impede
it.
CONCLUSION
The degree of an agency’s flexibility, procedural and substantive, in
implementing its statutory mandate can significantly influence both its
capacity and willingness to adapt to changing needs and circumstances. As
a rich literature attests, an agency’s exercise of procedural legal adaptive
capacity through techniques such as adaptive management can facilitate its
responsiveness to change, albeit at the potential cost of a loss of
accountability. As the comparative analysis of the five federal land systems
above illustrates, substantive legal adaptive capacity plays at least as
significant a role in supplying an agency with the tools it needs to meet the
challenges posed by changing conditions such as those arising from climate
change. Policymakers designing the contours of substantive legal adaptive
capacity must make several judgments. They need to consider the tradeoffs
implicated in affording more or less legal adaptive capacity. If such
capacity is desirable, they should recognize that alternative programmatic
goals may be equally flexible, but that some may prove more effective in
accommodating change than others. Finally, unused legal adaptive
capacity, no matter how it is defined, will not effectively accommodate
change, so it may be appropriate to narrow agency discretion to decide
whether or not to act adaptively.
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